A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism by Cho, Geung Ho
37
A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins 
of East Asian Collectivism*
Cho, Geung Ho**
Compared with individualistic culture of Western countries (e.g. America, Canada, 
Australia, Britain, France, Germany, and Netherlands etc.), East Asian countries (e.g. 
Korean, Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore etc.) have the collectivistic 
culture. People in these two cultures have different psychological and behavioral tendencies. 
In individualistic culture, they place high values on the independence and autonomy, 
frank expression of private feelings and needs, and stable consistency between personal 
dispositions and behaviors. On the other hand, in collectivistic culture they strive to achieve 
interdependence and harmony with others, to control the private feelings and needs, and 
to change themselves in accordance with their situations and relations with others. On the 
background of these differences, there lie different views of human being in general and self-
construal. That is, those living in the individualistic culture have individual-centered view of 
human being and independent (and separate) self-construal; in contrast with this, those in 
collectivistic culture have relation-centered view of human being and interdependent (and 
holistic) self-construal. In this paper, the author tried to explicate the origins of these cultural 
differences in the traditional system of thought in the Western and East Asian societies, and 
their theories of ideal person derived from these systems. From these review, it was found 
that the origin of Western individualism lies in the ideocentric liberalism, and that of East 
Asian collectivism lies in the strong tradition of Confucianism.
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It is well known that East Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, are characterized by a strong collectivistic 
culture, which is in contrast with the individualistic cultures of Western 
societies such as those of North America, Australia, and Northwestern 
Europe (Hofstede 1980, 1991). Compared to Westerners, East Asians tend 
to identify themselves in relation to others, prioritize collective goals over 
individual goals, find the driving force of social action in social rules, duties, 
and responsibilities, and try to maintain harmonious relationships with 
the group even when it is not favorable to the individual (Triandis 1995). 
Thus, East Asian countries show more interest and place great values on 
collectivistic behavior, which includes prioritizing group members over the 
individual, developing and maintaining harmonious relationships with group 
members, and adhering to social rules and responsibilities. 
The single largest commonality among East Asian countries, where 
collectivistic culture prevails, is their Confucian background.  China is the 
birth place of Confucianism, and from the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E. to 220 
C.E.) on, all Chinese dynasties turned to Confucianism for their political 
ideology, with the result that Confucianism permeated the society and 
influenced the psychological and behavioral tendencies of the Chinese 
(Kong, B. 1994: 17). Beginning from the 11th century, Korea has adopted 
Confucianism in a large scale and has been referred to as “the most 
Confucian country among all the East Asian countries since the Chosŏn 
dynasty (1392-1910)”. Korea is more “Confucian than Taiwan and China, let 
alone Hong Kong and Japan” (Ko, B. 1996: 280). Relatively, Confucianism 
is not deeply rooted in Japan; but in the Edo period (1603-1867) of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, Confucianism became widespread as an “ideology to 
justify class distinctions for feudality and to create loyalty towards the upper 
class” (Cho, K. 2000: 219). Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Confucianism 
“played a role to provide the whole society with the justification to guarantee 
loyalty towards the Emperor of Japan” and has been the dominant ideology 
until now (Cho, K. 2000: 219). 
Confucianism was the ruling ideology of the state throughout almost the 
entire history of China and most of the early modern history of Korea and 
Japan. After the Opium War (1840-1842), there arose strong agitation against 
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Confucianism in the aftermath of the Western imperialist penetration of Asia. 
Before long, however, such Confucian reform movements as the “Eastern 
Ways, Western Machines” movement of the late nineteenth century and 
the Modern Neo-Confucianism of the twentieth century became powerful. 
Confucianism is still “the mainstay of cultural tradition and remains as 
the backbone of the mindset/psyche of East Asians” (Lee, K. 1998: 63) and 
contributes to creating “the Confucian habits of the heart” (Tu, W. 1996: 
343).1
1 The reason why Confucian traditions manifested in East Asia lies in the environmental 
conditions of Ancient China. China was the source of East Asian cultural 
development. Nisbett (2003) suggested that the reason why Westerners (individualists) 
and East Asians (collectivists) differ in general psychological content and process lies 
in their differences in environmental conditions and philosophical social structure. 
According to him, Ancient Greece was surrounded by high mountains, and on the 
narrow seashore, the polis (city-state) developed. Migration and commerce among 
cities flourished, and confrontation and debate in the market and policy meetings 
were very important parts of life. However, in Ancient China, a centralized and 
hierarchical society developed on the broad and fertile prairie. The Ancient Chinese 
settled down in one region over a couple of generations and focused on agriculture. 
Therefore, pursuing collaboration and harmony with neighbors were very important 
parts of life. 
  Therefore, Ancient Greeks discriminated between me vs. not me, human vs. nature, 
and one object vs. another object and categorized them. Ancient Greeks abstracted 
their own consistent and invariable essence and tried to find their controlling 
principles. As a result, the independent subject, which was separated from context, 
became the focus of attention. Ancient Greeks tried to be aware of stable and 
invariable features of these separated subjects. Categorization, conflict resolution 
based on logical regulation, and analytical thinking were developed. On the contrary, 
the Ancient Chinese viewed the individual subject as not having any meaning and 
saw everything as existing in context. They tried to understand related roles and 
obligations in a constantly changing context and achieve harmony and order in 
collective life. Therefore, the whole field where they were located rather than separated 
and isolated subjects became the focus of attention. They tried to understand 
dynamically changing variability in the universal context and develop unity. Similarity 
of relationships, awareness of the Middle Way, conflict resolution through dialectics, 
and holistic thinking developed. 
  Westerners were influenced by Ancient Greek philosophy. They viewed society 
as consisting of separated and independent individuals as ultimate units, regarding 
society as only a congregate of individuals. Therefore, they showed strong tendency of 
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For example, although only 0.5% of Koreans reported Confucianism as 
their religion, Koreans demonstrate Confucian behaviors, attitudes, and 
habits in terms of basic actions and daily practices. Therefore, it has been 
suggested that 91.7 % of Koreans are “Confucians based on their beliefs and 
behaviors” (Ko, B. 1996: 294). In contemporary times, “many Koreans are 
Confucian in practice” (Youn, Y., Park, M., and Hur, N. 1985: 370). According 
to a group of researchers centered on M. H. Bond, East Asian college students 
from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea retain strong values 
reflecting “Confucian Dynamics” in comparison to Western college students 
from the United States, Britain, Canada, Germany, and Sweden (Chinese 
Culture Connection 1987). This suggests that Confucian practices are part of 
the general lifestyle of Chinese and Japanese, as in Korea.2
individualism that emphasized the individual rather than the group. Understanding 
society could be achieved by understanding individuals as units to construct society. 
They viewed stable and invariable unique inner traits that individuals accomplished 
(personality, ability, preference, attitude, need, emotion, will, and so on) as the 
impetus for individual actions and society’s operation. This individualistic view of 
human beings made Westerners perceive themselves as having an independent and 
autonomous existence separated from others. To the contrary, East Asians had been 
influenced by Ancient Chinese philosophy for a long time. They viewed society as 
consisting of relationships among people or groups, such as families, that form the 
prototype for relationships. They thought that a society was an organism in itself. 
They demonstrated a collectivistic tendency to emphasize the group where they are 
situated rather than the individual. Therefore, they demonstrated a relation-centered 
view of human beings in which each role, responsibility, and group regulation in 
the relationship is the impetus for individual actions and society’s operation. They 
perceived themselves as related to others in a network of general relationships. 
  Finally, Western individualism set priority on the individual as a unit rather than 
the group and society to which the individual belongs. This individualism flourishes 
in the ‘liberal’ ideology that views individuals as being equal, independent, and 
autonomous and emphasizes on the individual’s freedom, rights, and reason. The 
theoretical origin of modern individualism is liberalism. To the contrary, East Asian 
collectivism set priority on the group (family, friends, church, alumni, teams of the 
company, and so on) rather than the individual as a unit. Collectivists emphasized 
relationships among people. Their theoretical origin can be found in the Confucian 
system, in which compassion and interest in related others, social responsibility, and 
morality are important.
2 Keel, H. 1998: 3; Lee, K. 1998: 64-93; Tu, W. 1985, 1996: East Asians’ traditions include 
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In this context, people from contemporary East Asian countries, such 
as Korea, China, and Japan demonstrate collectivistic psychological and 
behavioral tendencies which can be assumed to be a result of their common 
cultural background, the Confucianism. Many studies have been conducted 
in order to examine this assumption. However, previous research on the 
influences of Confucian culture on East Asian societies, in general, focused 
on the negative behavioral characteristics of contemporary East Asians, 
particularly Koreans. It attributed the following characteristics of Koreans to 
a variety of systems, such as Daoism and Buddhism, in addition to Confucianism. 
Therefore, the theoretical origin of East Asians’ collectivism is not found only in 
Confucianism. Although there are many differences among these theoretical systems, 
they have more similarities with one another than they do to Western philosophical 
and religious systems. “All three orientations shard concerns about harmony, holism, 
and the mutual influence of everything on almost everything else” (Nisbett 2003: 17). 
That is, Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism perceive everything holistically rather 
than individually because all things in the universe relate to each other and exchange 
influence. These traditions view maintaining harmony in the network as the ultimate 
purpose of existence. East Asians’ traditional theories view everything, including 
human beings, as having a constantly changing, flexible existence in relationships: 
Everything reveals their real nature in the process of change. In this way, East Asians’ 
traditional theories, such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, had something 
in common; pursuing harmony in comprehensive interdependent relationships and 
focusing on dynamic variability. 
  Daoism emphasized connectedness and harmony between human beings and 
nature and their dynamic exchange of influences. This system viewes worldly human 
beings as belonging to nature. This system focused on nature rather than human 
beings (Morohashi, T. 1982/2001; Chen, G. 1994/1996; Nisbett 2003). Buddhism seeks 
the reason of human beings’ sorrow in the human existence and spatial-temporal 
connection. Their theory of awareness or self-cultivation viewed phenomena as 
neither fixed nor invariable; truth is constantly changing and circulating (Yun, H. 
1999; Morohashi, T. 1982/2001). That is, Buddhism emphasizes that human beings 
need to escape from the ties of this world and their dynamic relationships. Buddhism 
showed a tendency to ignore reality. To the contrary, Confucianism emphasizes 
interdependent connectedness and dynamics among human beings and promotes 
harmony in relationships among human beings. That is, Confucianism focuses on 
human relationships in groups and on the actual world of living (Morohashi, T. 
1982/2001; Cho, G. 2003a; Chen, G. 1994/1996). In this context, among East Asian 
traditional theories, Confucianism is the closest system to the features of collectivism, 
which has been shown in modern psychology.
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the influence of Confucianism: the loss of autonomy and individual freedom, 
patriarchal familism, class consciousness, customs that place the government 
over the people, respect for authority, emphasis on face, past-oriented 
thinking (Yoon, T. 1969, 1970), trying to read others’ minds, dependency, 
emphasis on moral justification, suppression of emotion and desire, lack of 
reasoning ability and creativity (Cha, J. 1994), toadyism, factionalism, looking 
down on technology, and aspiration after fame (Hyon, S. 1949).
While it is problematic to have focused on the negative aspects of East 
Asians and especially Koreans, a more serious problem was that the previous 
research neglected to discuss the specific connection between aspects of 
Confucianism and present behavioral traits or characteristics. There are 
several reasons why the previous research struggled with such problems. 
First, the researchers had no consistent framework for analysis of the effects 
of Confucian culture on the people of East Asia and simply tried to match 
quotations from the Confucian classics to specific behavioral characteristics. 
Second, analysis was conducted based on groundless everyday prejudice 
without collecting empirical data on characteristics of contemporary East 
Asians’ psychological and behavioral tendencies. And third, the discussion 
was not based on thorough investigations of Confucianism as a system of 
thought regarding human nature and behavior, but was carried out on the 
level of common sense reasoning.  
Therefore, this paper attempts to demonstrate that Confucianism 
provides the background for East Asian collectivism by using empirical data 
on behavioral characteristics and by using the theoretical framework for 
understanding human nature found in the Confucian classics.3 This paper 
makes use of concepts from contemporary cross-cultural psychology to 
survey and compare psychological and behavioral tendencies between East 
3 The Confucianism comprehends the system in the pre-Qin period, that in the Han-
Tang period, Neo-Confucianism in the Song period, that in the Qing period, and 
contemporary Modern Neo-Confucianism. Among these, the pre-Qin system, opened 
by Confucius and succeeded by Mencius and Xunzi, is the originator. In this paper, the 
author explored the Confucian theories of cognition, emotion, and motivation based 
on classics of pre-Qin Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi; and Neo-
Confucians’ new annotations and interpretations about pre-Qin classics, especially 
those of Zhu Xi of China and T’oegye and Yulgok of Korea.
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Asians and Westerners along with views on human beings derived from 
the Confucian classics as a basic frame of analysis.  This paper will seek to 
uncover if there is logical consistency between the empirical data on East 
Asians’ cognition, emotion, and motivation provided by cross-cultural 
psychology and the theory on the nature of the mind-and-heart (simsŏng) 
extracted from Confucian classics.
I.  BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR AN OVERVIEW OF CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES
An urgent task in psychological research on culture is the categorization 
of various cultures through the use of a small number of comparable 
types. That is because these become fundamental references to infer the 
relationship among culture, human psychology, and human behavior through 
cultural comparison. Therefore, a number of systems have been suggested 
as the criteria for comparing cultural differences. And the most prominent 
is the dimension of individualism-collectivism proposed by Hofstede’s 
comprehensive cross-cultural research (1980) with sixty-six countries (fifty-
three cultural groups).  
Since then, cross-cultural psychologists expected that the dimension of 
individualism and collectivism would be the most salient criteria for revealing 
cultural differences. The reason why cross-cultural psychologists paid more 
attention to this dimension was as follows (Kagitcibasi 1997): Most of all, this 
classification system is the most important dimension on which differences 
prevail among diverse cultures; that is “this is the major dimension creating 
differences in social actions among a variety of cultures all over the world” 
(Triandis 1988: 60). Therefore, it was expected that this classification system 
would be the general principle to explain cultural differences (Greenfield 
2000: 231; Kagitcibasi and Berry 1989: 515-520). Then, through this dimension 
was posited a close relationship between individualism and economic 
development (Hofstede 1980: 165-169; Hofstede 1991/1995: 116-119) that 
triggered the cross-cultural researchers’ long-standing interest to explain 
social phenomena (i.e., economic development) according to psychological 
tendencies (i.e., need for achievement, modernization, individualistic traits). 
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Also, this dimension was similar to other dimensions with which social 
scientists had been familiar, such as Toennies’ (1887-1957) Gesellshaft–
Gemeinshaft. This classification of culture featured simplicity and inclusivity, 
so it corresponded with the “principle of economy” which was required in 
scientific theory, and thus appealed to researchers’ interest since the 1980s. 
With this background, the individualism-collectivism model “organized 
cultural differences into overarching patterns, which facilitated comparative 
research and launched a rapidly expanding body of cultural and cross-cultural 
research in the ensuing 20 years” (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 
2002: 3). Since 1980 a massive amount of work has been carried out with the 
Individualism-Collectivism model, “so much so that the 1980s may be called 
the decade of I/C in cross-cultural psychology” (Kagitcibasi 1994: 52), and 
“judging from the research activity in Individualism/Collectivism up to now, 
we can expect this field to be active in the near future also” (Kagitcibasi 1997: 
39). 
According to Hofstede’s findings (1991/1996: 87; Table 3-1), East Asian 
countries, such as Taiwan (score 17), South Korea (18), Singapore (20), Hong 
Kong (25), and Japan (46), were skewed towards collectivism.4 Western 
countries from North America and Northwestern Europe, such as the United 
States (91), Australia (90), Britain (89), Canada (80), Netherlands (80), Italy 
(76), Belgium (75), Denmark (71), and France (71), demonstrated extreme 
individualism. Looking at these findings, East Asian countries, such as Korea, 
Japan, and China (including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), belong 
to a typical collectivist culture, and it is assumed that psychological and 
behavioral tendencies of East Asians should reveal features of collectivism. 
Therefore, cross-cultural researchers considered the United States, Canada, 
4 In this analysis, the range of distribution for individualism-collectivism scores was 
from 0 to 100 points. A higher score means stronger individualism, and a lower score 
means stronger collectivism. The mean estimated theoretically is 50 points. Scores 
under 50 indicate a collectivistic culture, and scores over 50 indicate an individualistic 
culture. Although these data did not include China, China has the strongest tendency 
toward collectivism in the East Asian region, according to Triandis (1995: 90-91). In 
Hofstede’s data, countries related to China such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
demonstrated strong collectivism. This result suggests that China is a very strong 
collectivistic society.
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and Australia as representative cultures of individualism and China, Japan, 
and Korea5 as representative of collectivistic cultures and made comparisons 
between the characteristics of their psychological and behavioral tendencies 
(Kagitcibasi 1997; Oyserman et al. 2002; Triandis 1995). 
In collectivist cultures, the primary group, such as a family, is the basic 
constructing unit of a society, and serves as the prototype for all social 
relationships. People in collectivistic cultures regard human beings and the 
self as being in a relationship and think that the meaning of life cannot be 
found away from relationships or the group. Therefore, the “relation-oriented 
view of human beings” and “interdependent self-construal” emerged as 
the dominant view of human beings and self-construal. On the contrary, 
in individualistic cultures, the basic unit of society is the individual who is 
independent and self-sufficient. People from individualistic cultures define 
human beings and the self as distinct individuals and the individual thinks 
himself/herself to be independent from others. They assume that one can find 
the meaning of life by expressing oneself and actualizing one’s uniqueness. 
Therefore, the “individual-centered view of human beings” and “independent 
self-construal” emerged as the dominant view of human beings and self-
construal.
These differences in the dominant views of human beings and self-
construal between collectivist and individualistic cultures create fundamental 
5 Even though three countries—Korea, China, and Japan—are categorized as one 
group of collectivist countries, their common classification does not mean that they 
do not have any differences among them. They have “collectivism” and “Confucian 
dynamics” in common. However, they demonstrate huge differences in the dimension 
of “masculinity-femininity” and “uncertainty avoidance” (Hofstede 1980, 1991/1995). 
These three countries also showed differences in the process of Confucian foundation. 
For example, in China (after Emperor Mu in the Han period) and Korea (after 
King Kwangchong in Koryŏ), the Civil Examination System administered and 
Confucians became governors for national operation. Japan does not have this history. 
Even though the three countries had the same background of Confucianism, the 
developmental process differed. However, according to cross-cultural research in the 
modern history of the three countries, they have a common history of Confucianism; 
and thus demonstrate very strong features of collectivism compared to Western 
individualistic society. Refer to the author’s article (Cho, G. 2007: chapter 6) on 
this issue and cultural differences among groups in the same country (i.e., among 
generations, levels of education etc.).
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differences in three aspects: origin of impetus for action, mode to express 
oneself, and changeability/stability of personhood in varying contexts or 
time series. Thus, different views of human beings and self-construal can be 
explained as differences in these three aspects,6 which reflect three central 
types of awareness regarding the mode of existence of human beings. 
The origin of impetus for action refers to the issues of sociality, such as 
how to relate to others and what kind of uniqueness to retain. Therefore, the 
origin of impetus for action makes differences of attention, whether actors 
focus on self-sufficient individuals (individualism) or on contexts and social 
relationships (collectivism).
The mode to express oneself, or whether to disclose or conceal oneself, 
refers to issues regarding the activity of self-manipulation. Therefore, they 
try to control the environment to fit it to the self and in this process manifest 
oneself actively (individualism) or control the self in accordance with the 
environment and relationships with others and in this process hide one’s true 
self (collectivism). 
The spatial-temporal changeability/stability refers to issues of consistency 
in one’s existence. Through this aspect one can divide people by those who 
identify their individual existence as stable, consistent, and substantial 
(individualism) or by those who identify their individual existence as a 
process of change according to their embedded situations and relationships 
(collectivism). 
These three aspects of human behavior and psyche, sociality of human 
existence (origin of impetus for actions), activity (mode to express one’s self), 
and changeability/stability (possibility of change in time and space), have 
been the essential issues of a number of philosophical and psychological 
explorations to deal with human issues in the history of human intelligence.
1. Location of Impetus for Action 
This aspect is concerned with whether the impetus for social action comes 
6 The author proved that most of the differences found in the cross-cultural studies 
between collectivism-individualism cultures can be arranged and understood on the 
basis of these three aspects (Cho, G. 1993, 1996, 1997, 1999a, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007).
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from relationship features, such as roles, obligations, rules, expectations, and 
norms, or from unique individual traits, such as personality, capability, values, 
desires, and emotions. This reveals differences in the conceptions about 
“to where one’s attention is paid”: either interdependence and relationship 
characteristics, or independence and individuality characteristics.  
This aspect shows the duality of human existence as a social being and as 
an individual. It reveals differences in attention—whether to focus on social 
features (collectivism) or individual features (individualism). As a matter of 
fact, to which features human beings pay more attention has been a central 
issue in cross-cultural studies (Allport 1968; Dulmen 1997/2005; Fiske, 
Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett 1998; Greenfield 2000; Kagitcibasi 1997; Kim 
1995; Laurent 1993/2001; Lukes 1973; Nisbett 2003; Triandis 1995). Whether 
they emphasize sociality or individuality represents fundamental differences 
in social structures and systems (Nisbett 2003: 29-39; Ross and Nisbett 1991: 
177-200). In reality, this aspect corresponds to the fundamental differences 
between collectivism and individualism. 
In collectivistic culture, where the relation-oriented view of human beings 
dominates, people recognize human beings in the context of interpersonal 
relationships and place the impetus for actions on the obligations, roles, 
and concern for others which are implied in such a relationship. Therefore, 
people attend primarily on one’s relationships with others and on contexts 
of their relationships. As a result, others, instead of oneself, stand out as the 
main focus of attention. And the pursuit of harmony in these interpersonal 
relationships becomes the purpose of any social action (Emphasis on 
Interdependence and Harmony).
On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-oriented 
views of human beings dominate, the impetus for social action stems from 
psychological traits, such as personality, ability, motivations, emotions, 
attitudes, and values, which independent and self-sufficient individuals 
have. In these cultures, individuals and their intrinsic traits are the focus of 
attention.  Therefore, the purpose of any social action would be to expand 
an individual’s autonomy and uniqueness (Emphasis on Independence and 
Autonomy).
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2. Style of Self-expression  
This aspect shows differences in the conception about whether human 
activity should be immersed inwardly or diffused outwardly. This is rooted in 
the different perspectives on the object of control. If one thinks that context 
and relationships with others are the center of the world, one’s own self would 
stand out as the target to be controlled, and the most of one’s activities are 
going to orient to one’s inner world. Therefore, in this case, when there is 
a discrepancy between the needs and goals of oneself and those of others, 
people tend to suppress their own needs and change themselves to harmonize 
with the needs of the context and others. On the contrary, if one thinks that 
his/her own self is at the center of the world, the context and other persons 
outside of the self will be the orientation of activity. Therefore, when there 
is a discrepancy between the needs and goals of oneself and those of others, 
people are likely to find the context and the other outside of the self as the 
object to control. That is, they tend to change the outer world to fit them in 
the needs of one’s own self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a: 228-229).
This aspect reveals differences in awareness about the orientation of 
human activity. Jung (1923/1971) proposed “introversion” and “extraversion” 
as the two fundamental personality types which represent the general 
attitudes on life and human activities. “Extraversion refers to an attitude 
on life that is directed to the outer world, whereas introversion refers to an 
attitude on life that focuses on the inner world (one’s own thought, emotion, 
experiences, etc.)” (Min, K. 2002: 68). That is, “extravert is directed toward 
the outside world while the introvert directs his attention inward” (McAdams 
2001: 309). His theory of two types of personality orientation affected a 
number of personality psychologists, such as Eysenck and Rotter and the “Big 
Five Model” (Hong, S. 2004: 190-192; Hall and Lindzey 1978/1987: 154-159; 
McAdams 2001: 368-371), and has been accepted as the most fundamental 
way to analyze personality and modes of adaptation to the world.7
7 Hall and Lindzey (1978) stated that “the originality and audacity of Jung’s thinking 
have few parallels in recent scientific theories, and no other person aside from Freud 
has opened more conceptual windows into what Jung would choose to call ‘the soul of 
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In collectivistic cultures, where relation-centered view of human beings 
prevails, it is expected that people control their desires or goals as much 
as possible, suppress oneself, yield to, and cooperate with others, because 
the pursuit of individual desires and goals tend to interfere with harmony 
and provoke conflicts in social relationships. In addition, in this culture, 
suppressing and hiding the self in the group would be regarded as the way to 
maintaining harmony within the group (Emphasis on Self-restraint).
On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-centered 
view of human beings is dominant, the pursuit of one’s own desire is 
considered as a natural human right and it is taken for granted that people 
control the environment and others in order to pursue their own interests, 
needs, and goals. Therefore, active self-assertiveness to reveal one’s own 
uniqueness and self-expression to reveal one’s needs, goals, and emotions are 
emphasized even though they impair the harmony of the group (Emphasis on 
Self-assertion).
3. Variability/Stability 
The aspect of variability/stability reveals differences in the conceptions of 
human changeability or fixedness; whether the individual, as an actor in 
a society, is open to change or has fixed invariableness in terms of time 
(series of past, present, and future) and space (a variety of relationships and 
contexts). That is whether individuals are “in the process of becoming” in 
response to changing circumstances in life, or are “fixed and stable entities” 
that are irresponsive to changing circumstances.  
The variability debate over whether human beings can or cannot change 
has deep roots so that any theory of personality can be correlated to this 
aspect. The questions that arise here are: Is the individual’s personality 
structure able to change substantially as time goes on? Furthermore, is 
change indispensable in the development of a personality structure? Or 
man’” (149), and appraised Jung’s theoretical system on extraversion-introversion very 
highly. It is true that “the influence of Jung’s theory is significantly powerful in most of 
the scientific sphere such as humanities and social sciences” (Hong, S. 2004: 192). The 
favorable evaluation of Jung’s achievement reveals that the dimension of autonomy 
and action orientation is one of the core aspects to understand human beings.
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is the apparent change that we observe in others only just the pretense of 
change in overt behavior without changing innermost structure of one’s 
personality? Most of personality theorists demonstrate differences in regards 
to this problem of personality stability (Hjelle and Ziegier 1981/1983: 35). For 
example, Erickson’s theory is based on the assumption that human beings are 
constantly changing, whereas Freud’s theory is based on the assumption that 
the personality, which was developed during infancy, is not going to change 
basically in the course of life.8
In collectivistic cultures, where the relation-centered view of human 
beings prevails, the stability of a society depends upon the stability of 
relationships which are constituents of the society. People in this cultures 
assume that stability will be realized when they adjust their own actions 
flexibly in accordance with changing roles in a variety of contexts and 
relationships. Therefore, flexible variation in dispositions (personality, ability, 
and so on) in accordance with context is appreciated and emphasized. In 
collectivistic cultures, an individual’s personality and ability are considered to 
change as time and contexts are varying, so the present individual is always 
in the process of changing. Therefore, every person should ascertain and 
improve one’s weaknesses and shortcomings, and this is the chief way of 
improving oneself (Emphasis on Variability/Flexibility and Improvement of 
Shortcomings).
On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, the stability of a society 
is grounded on the stability of individuals as the constituent elements of 
the society. People in this culture assume that because each individual has 
consistent and enduring stable characteristics from birth, they do not change 
as context and relationships are varying, and regard variability as serious 
threats to their existence. Therefore, rather than acknowledging their own 
weaknesses and improving them, they try to find out and expand their own 
original strengths, and accept this as the chief way of self-improvement 
8 According to Hjelle and Ziegler (1981/1983), Freud (35-36, 83), Adler (130-131) and 
Murray (211) exhibited a strong position of invariability, whereas Erikson (35, 170-
171), Skinner (257), Bandura (302-303), Kelly (394-395), Maslow (431-432), and 
Rogers (475-476) asserted strong position of variability. Allport (351-352) suggested a 
mediating position in this continuum. The author proposed some hints to consider in 
comparing Western and East Asian cultures in this aspect (Cho, G. 2003: 479-480).
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(Emphasis on Stability and Expansion of Strengths).  
4. Comparison of Framework for an Overview of Cultural Differences 
The differences in the emphasis of these three aspects, which are derived from 
differences in the modes of understanding human beings, form the cultural 
imperatives which each society pursues. In collectivistic cultures, which 
regard social relationships as the ultimate constituent of a society, the pursuit 
of connectedness and harmony, self-restraint, flexible variation with time 
and context, and improvement of one’s own weaknesses would become the 
cultural imperatives. On the contrary, to pursue independence and autonomy, 
self-assertion, stability, and expansion of one’s own strengths would operate 
as the cultural imperatives in individualistic cultures, which assume an 
individual as the basic constituent of a society. According to the viewpoint 
of social constructionism, these cultural imperatives are molded into general 
human psychological tendencies, such as cognition, motivation, and emotion 
(Gergen and Davis 1985; Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1991b, 1994a, 1994b; 
Nisbett 2003; Sedikides and Brewer 2001). 
In this paper, the author will review research findings about distinctive 
differences in cognition, emotion, and motivation between people from 
collectivistic cultures and from individualistic cultures, using above-
mentioned framework. As elucidated above, the three aspects of the 
framework correspond to the essential conceptions about human existence; 
what is the chief constituent of a society (sociality/individuality), whether to 
hide the self or express it (activity), and whether the self is changeable or fixed 
(variability). Therefore, the above-mentioned framework, with which the 
author is going to review and explain psychological and behavioral differences 
between collectivism and individualism, has very wide range of application 
and logical coherence. Table 1 provides a summary of the frameworks for an 
overview of cultural differences. 
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II.  CHARACTERISTICS OF MENTALITY AND BEHAVIOR IN 
COLLECTIVISTIC AND INDIVIDUALISTIC CULTURES
As discussed earlier, collectivism and individualism are the most important 
systems producing differences in social action among a variety of cultures 
all over the world. Since the 1980s, this system was held to be a universal 
principle that can explain cultural differences and thus stimulated most of 
the cross-cultural researches. These cross-cultural studies compared and 
analyzed differences in a number of aspects of mentality and behavior such 
as cognition, emotion, and motivation in college students and adults between 
two cultural groups: Korea, China, and Japan (collectivistic culture) and the 
United States, Canada and Australia (individualistic culture). In this paper, 
the findings of these researches will be summarized based on the differences 
on emphasis according to the three aspects described in Table 1.9
9 Refer to the author’s articles for details of the differences in three-aspect emphasis 
between two cultures in the area of cognition, emotion, and motivation (Cho, G. 2003: 
chapters 3, 4 and 5; 2007: chapters 3, 4 and 5).
Table 1. Cultural differences in emphasis on the three aspects 
Aspects
Collectivism
(Relation-oriented view of 
human beings)
Individualism
(Individual-oriented view of 
human beings)
Impetus and goals for 
social action
(focus of attention)
Emphasis on connectedness 
and harmony
Emphasis on autonomy and 
uniqueness
Mode of self-expression 
(object to control)
Emphasis on self-restraint Emphasis on self-assertion
Variability/Stability of 
Personhood (strategy for 
self-development)
Emphasis on flexibility and 
weakness improvement
Emphasis on stability and 
expansion of strengths
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1.  Focus of Attention: Emphasis on Connectedness/Harmony vs. 
Autonomy/Uniqueness 
The aspect of the impetus for action refers to whether impetus for social 
actions are triggered by the relationship traits, such as responsibility, 
obligation, expectation, and regulation, or by the individually unique 
psychological traits, such as personality, ability, value, desire, and emotion. 
This reveals differences in perceptions of the focus of attention: on relationship 
and interdependence or on individuality and independence. 
In collectivistic cultures, where relation-centered view of human beings 
dominate, human beings are defined in their relationship with others, thus 
responsibility/obligation in these relationship and concern for/compassion 
to related-others would operate as the impetus for social action. In these 
cultures, people should focus their attention more on the relationship 
characteristics than on their individuality. Therefore, the purpose of social 
action becomes the pursuit of harmony in these relationships. On the 
contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-oriented view of 
human beings dominates, the impetus for social action comes from one’s 
psychological traits. Therefore, autonomy and uniqueness of an individual is 
emphasized as the fundamental purpose of social actions. 
1) Interpersonal Assessment 
Due to these differences in focus, the two cultures emphasize different 
contents in socialization and thus appreciate different features in interpersonal 
assessment. In collectivistic cultures, the focus of socialization is imposed 
on learning “Who am I?” (understanding one’s position in the group) and 
on pursuing similarity with other group members. The establishment of 
harmonious relationships with group members becomes the main way 
of positive self-assessment. Therefore, they appreciate highly and try to 
develop relationship features (kindness, compassion, gentleness, humbleness, 
generosity, and so on) which would bring about harmony in social relations.
On the contrary, people in individualistic cultures place emphasis on 
learning “What can I do?” (understanding one’s capabilities) and pursue one’s 
uniqueness in the process of socialization. Improvements in individual traits 
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(ability, achievement, etc.) would be the basis for self-assessment. Therefore, 
they make an effort to identify and enhance unique strengths of their own, 
and value highly the traits related to expressing their strengths actively and 
positively (extroversion, self-assertiveness, leadership, volubility, etc.) (Bond 
and Hwang 1986; Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and Lehmanm 1997; Kitayama, 
Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit 1997; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and 
Roman 1995; Triandis 1995). 
2) Attribution 
In collectivistic cultures, people perceive their relationships as based on 
external situational factors rather than individual personality traits. Because 
they regard social pressure and responsibility in the relationship as impetus 
for action, they display a situationalist bias (searching the reason for actions 
in contextual factors rather than personal traits) in their attribution.
In contrast, people in individualistic cultures perceive themselves as an 
independent entity with psychological stability. Therefore, people consider 
these independent individual traits as impetus for action and display a 
dispositionalist bias (finding the reasons for actions primarily in personal 
traits rather than situational factors) in their attribution (Fiske et al. 1998; 
Markus and Kitayama 1991a; Morris and Peng 1994; Nisbett 2003; Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi and Norenzayan 2001).
3) Emotion
Collectivists are sensitive to emotions that contribute to maintaining 
compassionate and harmonious relationships and appreciate these emotions 
highly. Therefore, in collectivistic cultures, the integrating emotions, such 
as sympathy, empathy, and shame, which take others as the primary locus 
of reference, are encouraged in socialization process, and thus collectivists 
experience these emotions more in the course of everyday life.  
By contrast, individualists tend to be sensitive to those emotions 
which contribute to maintaining and enhancing individual autonomy and 
uniqueness, and value them highly. Therefore, in individualistic cultures, the 
differentiating emotions, such as pride, happiness, or anger, which regard 
an individual’s inner states as the primary locus of reference and which can 
promote separation and independence among individuals, are encouraged in 
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the process of socialization, and thus individualists experience these emotions 
more in everyday life (Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1994b; Matsumoto 1989). 
4) Motivation 
In collectivistic cultures, communion motives are appreciated because these 
motives “produce behavior that brings the individual closer to other people 
and fosters a sense of community between the person and his or her social 
environment” (Geen 1995: 249). This communion motives prioritize the 
concern for others and the group over the individual, and are oriented toward 
belonging to the group. The motives of belongingness, respect, imitation, 
closeness, and social forgiveness are included in this category, and are 
appeared more frequently in the collectivistic cultures than in individualistic 
cultures. 
On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, agency motives are emphasized. 
These motives “are associated with behavior that tends to separate the 
individual from the immediate community and to emphasize individual gains 
that are either independent of or at the expense of other persons in the social 
environment” (Geen 1995: 249). This agency motives prioritize the individual 
over others or the group, and promote and enhance individualists’ sense of 
individual independence from others. They enclude the motives of autonomy, 
independence, success, dominance, and self-demonstration and so on, and 
are experienced more in individualistic cultures (Geen 1995; Markus and 
Kitayama 1991a; Wiggins 1992). 
2. Object to Control: Emphasis on Self-restraint vs. Self-assertion
Differences in the styles of self-expression reveal differences in awareness 
about whether human activity should be submerged inwardly or diffused 
outwardly. This aspect reflects differences in perspectives regarding what 
is considered to be the object to control. If one assumes that surrounding 
context and relationships with others are at the center of all happenings, and 
that one’s activities should direct toward oneself, then he/she would find the 
object to control in his/her own self. But if the self is located at the center 
of all things, and one’s activities direct toward the surrounding context and 
others, then he/she finds the object to control in the context or others besides 
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oneself. 
In this background, it is presumed that in collectivistic cultures, where the 
relation-centered view of human beings prevail and the pursuits of personal 
needs or goals are assumed to disrupt harmony and to create conflicts in 
social relationships, people are encouraged to control their desires or goals 
as much as possible, to suppress the self, to yield to others, and to cooperate 
with them. To the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where the individual-
centered view of human beings are dominant and individuals’ pursuit of their 
personal goals and desires are taken for granted because it is one of their 
natural rights, it is encouraged for their members to control the environment 
and others and to express oneself freely and actively in the course of pursuing 
their personal interests, needs, and goals. 
1) Interpersonal assessment 
Differences in the modes of self-expression bring forth the differences in the 
style of resolving interpersonal conflicts. People in collectivistic cultures like 
to resolve conflicts through making concession and mediation, and prefer 
to avoid conflicts rather than to face them, whereas people in individualistic 
cultures like to resolve conflicts by facing them through competition and 
confrontation (Nisbett 2003; Peng and Nisbett 1999; Triandis 1989). 
Differences in conflict resolution style have a connection with differences 
in features that are valued in each culture. That is, in collectivistic cultures, 
making concession, cooperation, modesty, and introversion are valued as 
contributing to harmonious relationships, whereas in individualistic cultures, 
activeness, frankness, competition, and extraversion to express personal 
uniqueness and achievement are valued (Barnlund 1975). 
2) Attribution
Collectivists are more likely to show a modesty bias in the process of 
attributing achievement; they attribute their own success to external factors 
such as luck or others’ help, whereas attributing failure to internal factors 
such as deficiency of ability or effort.
To the contrary, individualists tend to display an ego-enhancing bias; 
they attribute their success to internal factors such as superior capability, and 
attribute failure to external factors such as bad luck (Davis and Stephan 1980; 
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Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and Lehman 1977; Markus and Kitayama 1991a). 
3) Emotion
The display rules for showing one’s emotional state regulate and control 
emotional expression in a social context (Ekman 1982). In collectivistic 
cultures, the expression of other-focused emotions such as sympathy and 
empathy is recommended, but expression of ego-centered emotions such as 
pride and anger is inhibited. 
In contrast, in individualistic cultures, because emotional expression is 
assumed to reflect frankness and sincerity, people are advised to express 
freely any affects. In these cultures, inhibition of emotional expression is 
seen as provoking psychological maladjustment, so to express freely even 
the negative affect such as anger is assumed to bring about positive results 
in regulating relations among humans (Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1994b; 
Matsumoto 1989, 2000). 
4) Motivation
In collectivistic cultures, people experience personal competency through 
sensitivity toward others, adjustment to the needs of the context, and self-
inhibition and regulation. In these cultures, the meaning of control becomes 
inhibiting inner traits such as personal needs, goals, and feelings in order to 
develop the sense of interdependence and connectedness. Therefore, self-
inhibition and the maintenance of harmonious interpersonal relationships 
are the sources of self-respect, and the motives to control inner desires are 
strongly encouraged. 
To the contrary, in individualistic cultures, because people experience 
personal competency through expressing inner needs, feelings, and capabilities 
freely and overcoming social pressure actively, control means changing the 
social context and external restraints in order to achieve personal goals. 
Therefore, in these cultures, uniqueness, superiority, effective self-expression, 
and freedom from external restraints are the sources of self-respect, and 
motives to control the external environment are promoted (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991a; Rothbaum, Weisz, and Synder 1982; Weisz, Rothbaum, and 
Blackburn 1984). 
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3.  Variability in Mindset and Action:  Emphasis on Flexible Change vs. 
Stability 
The aspect of variability in human mindset (e.g., personality, ability, etc.) 
and behavior represents differences in awareness of whether the individual 
as a living organism in society is open or closed in regard to time (time 
sequence such as past, present, future) and space (a variety of contexts and 
relationships). 
In collectivistic cultures with relation-centered view of human beings, 
they assume that stability of a society is based on the stability of relationships 
of which the society is constructed, and that social stability will be achieved 
when an individual regulates and vary his/her behavior according to the 
variation of contexts and relationships, so flexible variations in accordance 
with the changing contexts are highly emphasized. However, in individualistic 
cultures with an individual-centered view of human beings, people assume 
that individual stability is the basis of the stability of a society and that each 
individual has stable and consistent characteristics from birth. Therefore, in 
these cultures, variability with the changing contexts and inconsistency in 
the modes of adaptation are regarded as serious threats to the individual, so 
stability and consistency in the process of  living are strongly appreciated.
1) Interpersonal assessment
Collectivists strongly believe in variability, that is, they believe that personality 
can change according to time and context, so individual behavior is 
induced by interactions with context rather than stable inner characteristics 
(Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett 2002). It was found that collectivists 
demonstrate the “Barnum effect” (the phenomena that people think they have 
both positive traits such as politeness and negative traits such as rudeness as 
well)  more often than individualists do (Choi, I. and Choi, Y. 2002), and they 
(Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese) indicate that the rate of negative traits and 
positive traits that they have is the same or the percentage of negative traits is 
higher than their positive ones (Bond and Cheung 1983; Stigler, Smith, and 
Mao 1985). This means that negative traits are tolerated as likely as positive 
ones in collectivistic cultures.  
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On the contrary, individualists (Americans) identify themselves with only 
positive traits; that is, they evaluate that their positive traits outnumber their 
negative ones by four or five times (Stigler et al. 1985).
2) Attribution
In collectivistic cultures, as people emphasize variability—that is, they change 
their behaviors in accordance with variations in context—the effort to change 
to fit one’s context is more valued than relatively stable and fixed capabilities; 
thus, people tend to attribute performance to effort rather than ability. 
In contrast, because individualists regard stable and consistent traits as the 
impetus for actions, fixed and stable capability is valued more than context-
variable effort, and people are more likely to attribute performance to ability 
(Mizokawa and Ryckman 1990; Stevenson and Stigler 1992).
3) Emotion
In collectivistic cultures, the cultural imperative is the establishment of 
connectedness, so people focus on compassion and harmony maintenance 
and make efforts toward self-inhibition, exploring one’s weaknesses, and 
improving them. Therefore, they are more sensitive to their own negative 
traits and negative feelings than their positive traits and positive feelings, 
and are more accepting of negative feelings. That is, collectivists frequently 
experience negative feelings such as shame, sadness, pity, and regret, and they 
tend to consider those feelings desirable. 
In contrast, in individualistic cultures, people are more sensitive to 
positive feelings, such as pride, happiness, joy, and pleasure, and they tend to 
experience positive feelings more frequently. In these cultures, only positive 
feelings are considered to be desirable, and the extent of tolerance of negative 
feelings is very limited (Cha, K. 1995; Diener, Suh, Smith, and Shao 1995; 
Kitayama and Markus 1991a, 1994b; Suh and Diener 1995). 
4) Motivation 
As people in collectivist cultures acknowledge and focus on variability in 
psychological and behavioral tendencies, discrepancy between individual 
inner traits and overt behaviors or between actions in various social settings 
are not regarded as troubles, thus people in these cultures do not tend to 
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pursue consistency. 
In contrast, since people in individualistic cultures see individual behavior 
as the representation of stable inner traits, discrepancy between inner 
traits and behaviors or between actions in social contexts are expected to 
induce serious confusion in individual identity, and the motives to achieve 
consistency become stronger in these cultures (Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and 
Lehman 1997; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Nisbett et al. 2001). 
III.  CONFUCIANISM AND FEATURES OF COLLECTIVISTIC 
CULTURE
Confucianism, which has been the basis of East Asian’s life since ancient 
times, starts with propositions about innate characteristics of a person (Theory 
of Human Nature), then induces from this propositions the ideal states a 
person can achieve (Theory of the Superior Man), the way to accomplish this 
ideal (Theory of Self-cultivation) and the lifestyles of the ideal person (Theory 
of Moral Practice) (Cho, G. 1998, 199b, 2003, 2006, 2007). Among these four 
systems, the basis of Confucianism is the theory of human nature (Kim, C. 
1982: 170, 172-175; Fung, Y. 1948/1977: 105-107; Needham 1969/1986: 21-
29). According to the Confucian understanding of human nature, all human 
beings are endowed with the Four Beginnings (benevolence [humanity, 
humaneness], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) which form the basis 
of the sociality and morality of human existence. All of the other systems of 
Confucianism (the Superior Man, moral practice, and self-cultivation) are 
based on this understanding of human nature as a social and moral being, 
and we can trace the intellectual foundation of East Asian collectivism on this 
background.  
The core of Confucianism can be summarized as the “expansion of human 
existence.” Confucians scrutinize the possibility of existence-expansion 
through perspectives on the innateness of morality, sociality, and plasticity 
(human nature), establish an ideal model of existence-expansion (Superior 
Man), and suggest a method to expand one’s existence (self-cultivation and 
moral practice).
The most basic way to expand human existence put forth by Confucianism 
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is to have concern for others, to have compassion for them, and to assist 
them, as well as the self, in achieving the status of Superior Man, thereby to 
unite oneself with others in the Way that human beings should pursue in the 
course of everyday life.  
Confucianism regards interest in and compassion for others as the basic 
impetus of human life. East Asians have lived with Confucianism as a basic 
way of life for a long time. Therefore, Confucianism was the theoretical 
background that led collectivism to flourish in East Asian society. In this 
context, it is evident that above-mentioned three aspects of emphasis in 
modern collectivistic cultures (connectedness and harmony, self-restraint, 
and variability and self-improvement) have a close logical relationship with 
understandings of human beings and their psychology in Confucianism. 
1. Confucian View of Human Beings and Its Collectivistic Features  
The basis for Confucians’ emphasis on the expansion of human existence 
lies in the fundamental framework by which they understand human beings. 
The basic perspective for understanding human beings permeates the 
Confucian classics, especially those from pre-Qin Confucianism, and can be 
summarized in three different ways.10 Confucians assert that human beings 
are identified as having infinite potential and plasticity, existing and living in 
social relations, and pursuing morality subjectively. That is, humans are social 
beings who should accept and perform social responsibility given to them in 
the interpersonal relations and are dynamic moral subjects with the potential 
to overcome their personal/biological limitations, and thereby to expand their 
existence. 
The following three statements in Xue Er (Book 1), chapter 111 of the 
Analects written by Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, reveal that 
Confucians identified human beings from these three perspectives.   
10 Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2006: 297-320; 2007: chapter 2).
11 This refers to Chapter 1, Xue Er (Book 1) in the Analects based on Zhu Xi’s The 
Collected Annotations of the Analects. From now on, citation of the Analects will follow 
this example.
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Confucius said: “To learn and to realize what one has learned all the time, 
isn’t that a pleasure? A still greater pleasure rests in friends coming from far, 
doesn’t it? Is he not a Superior Man who feels no discomposure at others’ 
failure to appreciate him?”
The first statement indicates that human beings possess infinite possibilities 
(a person can become a Superior Man through learning); the second shows 
that humans are social beings (a person is supposed to get along with others 
in relationships); and the third reveals that human beings are dynamic moral 
subjects (the self, as a moral being, is the subject for everything in life, and 
each individual needs to find behavioral impetus in the morality one has from 
birth and take full responsibility by oneself). 
1) Person as a Social Being and Focus of Attention 
(1) Social Being
In the Analects Confucius asserted that humanity (benevolence) is the core 
of his thought, and the compassion for and concern about others form the 
core of humanity. Confucius said: “Humanity (benevolence) is establishing 
others first if you want to establish yourself, and letting other achieve first if 
you want to achieve” (Analects, Yong Ye, 28); “Humanity (benevolence) is not 
allowing others to do what I do not want to do” (Yan Yuan, 2; Wei Ling Gong, 
23); and “Humanity (benevolence) means loving others (Yan Yuan, 22).” This 
reveals that Confucius defined human beings’ sociality (compassion for and 
concern about others) as the core of human existence.
The fact that Confucius emphasized the features of humans as social 
beings most of all can be found in his proposition of Rectification of Names. 
He said that conducting completely one’s own responsibility in society is the 
core of maintaining social order and harmony. That is, Confucius stated: 
“The king needs to take the responsibility of the king, the minister needs to 
take the responsibility of the minister, the parent needs to take the parent’s 
responsibility, and the child needs to take the child’s responsibility” (Yan 
Yuan, 11). This proposition is the fundamental basis of both political and 
social affairs to create order and harmony in society, as seen in Confucius’ 
statement that if he took responsibility for political affairs, he would 
first rectify names (work to let each individual fully meet his or her own 
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responsibility) (Zi Lu, 3).
Confucius’ opinion was followed Mencius and Xunzi in the pre-Qin 
period. Mencius said that human beings possess inherently the basis of 
morality, which is known from the fact that everyone loves his/her parents 
and respects his/her elder siblings without learning (Mencius, Jin Xin I, 15).12 
Mencius asserted that “The core of humanity (benevolence) is living with 
one’s parents, the core of righteousness is following elder siblings, the core of 
wisdom is learning and maintaining these two, and the core of propriety is 
regulating these two and decorating them beautifully” (Li Lou I, 27). From 
this assertion, we can understand that Mencius sought for the core of moral 
principles—humanity (benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom—
in the emotions sprung up in social relationships (feelings of love for one’s 
family and respect for the old). 
In this way, Mencius found the purpose of human existence in social 
relationships. He proposed that features of human existence manifest in 
interpersonal relationships such as parent-child, king-minister, husband-
wife, old-young, and friend-friend, and the purpose of individual existence 
cannot be found without and outside these interpersonal relations. According 
to him, there are five responsibilities that human beings need to meet in each 
of the five relations above, respectively: affection, righteousness, separation of 
functions, order, and trust, through which harmony can be brought to these 
relations. The statement that “If human beings live freely without learning, 
they are going to be animals, so the Sage was concerned and had people 
learn to observe human responsibilities” (Teng Wen Gong I, 4) demonstrates 
Mencius’ opinion. 
Xunzi also focused on sociality and identified social relationships as the 
basis of human existence. He argued that interdependence and connectedness 
is the very core features of human existence, and thus human beings do not 
live independently and separately from each other. Xunzi proposed: “The 
relation of king-minister, parent-child, elder-younger siblings, and husband-
wife is the first and the last, the last and the first, has the same principle 
as Heaven, continues to exist forever in all ages, and is called ‘the great 
12 This refers to Chapter 15, Jin Xin I in Mencius based on Zhu Xi’s The Collected 
Annotations of Mencius. From now on, citation of Mencius will follow this example. 
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basis’” (Xunzi, Wang Zhi, 19-20).13 This statement points out that social 
relationships, such as parent-child, king-minister, old-young, husband-wife 
and friend-friend, are the ultimate unit to construct a society.
As confirmed evidently up to now, Confucians seek fundamental features 
of human existence in their sociality. That is, Confucianism is the system to 
identify features of human existence in the various interpersonal relations, 
and, to summarize in a word, it has the perspective to view person as a 
social being. Because the feature of sociality is the core of Confucian view of 
human beings, all the other important thoughts of Confucianism, such as the 
innateness of Four Moral Principles (benevolence [humanity, humaneness], 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom), are derived from this perspective of 
human sociality.
(2) Emphasis on Others and Relationships
The Confucian proposition to understand person as a social being derives 
from the conception of social relationships as the ultimate constituent of a 
society. Confucians argue that the purpose of social actions is to pursue order 
and harmony in interpersonal relationships, and this order and harmony can 
be achieved by performing his/her original responsibilities inherent in each 
of the relationships. Therefore, in Confucianism, the impetus for social action 
can be found in performing responsibility and obligation in relationships 
with others, and thus interconnectedness and harmony among people and 
concerns about others are emphasized. This position is consistent with the 
characteristics of collectivistic cultures, which focus on connectedness and 
harmony among people, contrary to individualistic cultures, which focus on 
autonomy and independence, as summarized in the first row of Table 1 (focus 
of attention). 
2) Person as a Moral Being and the Object to Control 
(1) Moral being
The second feature of the Confucian understanding of human beings is 
emphasis on the activeness and subjectivity of human beings as moral 
13 This refers to pages 19-20, Wangshi in Xunzi based on Wang Shunkyum’s The Collected 
Annotations of Xunzi. From now on, citation of Xunzi will follow this example.
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subjects. Confucians seek the basis of morality in ordinary men’s subjective 
perception of the innateness of their sociality and in their search for their 
own moral responsibility in social relations. Confucius said: “Practicing 
humanity (benevolence) depends on the self, not others” (Analects, Yan Yuan, 
1). That is, the Superior Man is well aware that he himself is a moral subject, 
so “Contrary to ordinary people who lay their responsibilities on others, the 
Superior Man takes his own responsibility” (Wei Ling Gong, 20). Therefore, 
the “Superior Man feels no discomposure at others’ failure to appreciate 
him” (Xue Er, 1), because the Superior Man searches the cause (the reason 
why others do not appreciate his true superiority or nobleness) in his own 
incapability or deficiency (Li Ren, 14). 
Mencius found the basis of human activeness and identity in the fact 
that human beings innately possess the beginnings of morality: humanity 
(benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (Mencius, Gong Sun 
Chou I, 6). Mencius said that human beings need to be aware that they 
themselves are moral subjects and expand this awareness in order to maintain 
the good moral beginnings that they originally possess (Gong Sun Chou I, 
6). In order to perceive and expand themselves as moral subjects, “Human 
beings need to find all responsibilities in themselves” (Li Lou I, 4). That is, 
because “Everyman has all the principles of things” (Jin Xin I, 4),  every 
person is a subject of all things, and all things are from him/her, thus he/she, 
as an autonomous subject, need to find all the responsibilities in himself/
herself.      
Xunzi also identified humans as active and autonomous beings in moral 
point of view. According to him, human beings grant order to Nature, govern 
all things by their own active and autonomous effort (Xunzi, Tianlun, 21-
23), and take part in the harmony of all things (Theory of Ritual, 24-25). “The 
Way is neither from Heaven nor from Earth. The Way is what humans should 
conduct and the Superior Man is to follow” (Ruxiao, 9-10). This opinion 
reveals the position of understanding humans as the entities who identify the 
self as active and autonomous moral being. 
Such human activeness and subjectivity is based on awareness of human 
sociality and morality. The self possesses all the basis of morality innately, 
should maintain and nurture them, and should practice them in daily life; 
this is the basic Confucian position regarding the attitude toward an active 
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and autonomous life. Therefore, the position to understand human beings 
as active moral subjects originate from the perspective on humans as social 
beings. 
(2) Emphasis on Self-control
The position of Confucians to understand human beings as active subjects 
is derived from their awareness that human beings innately possess the basis 
of morality. This position tends to attribute the causes of any social actions 
to one’s innate moralities, and to emphasize exploring this inner world as the 
originator of one’s social actions. That is, every person is the source of active 
and autonomous actions, and so the person takes responsibility for all the 
results of one’s actions automatically. Therefore, Confucians assume that the 
very target to control is oneself as the originator of one’s actions, and self-
restraint is recommended rather than self-assertion in situations of conflict. 
As depicted in the aspect of the object to control (mode of expressing the self) 
in the second row of Table 1, this is the same as the position of collectivistic 
cultures in emphasizing self-restraint, unlike the individualistic cultures’ 
focus on self-assertion.
3) Person as a Plastic (Variable) Being and Action Variability
(1) Plastic (Variable) Being
From pre-Qin period on, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of 
learning and teaching. Confucians define human beings not as a congregate 
of fixed and self-sufficient attributes but as a plastic and variable being who 
are in the process of becoming through learning. Confucius called himself “the 
person who loves to learn” (Analects, Gong Ye Chang, 27) and “the person 
who does not neglect teaching” (Shu Er, 33). This shows how much Confucius 
emphasized the values of learning and teaching in human life. Confucius 
and his disciples tried to improve themselves through learning, teaching, 
reflecting on what they had learned, and practicing them in daily life; and 
thought this is the very core in the process of self-cultivation (Xue Er, 4; Shu 
Er, 2, 3). Confucius believed that teaching enables anyone to be nice. He did 
not discriminate against people (Wei Ling Gong, 38) and taught anyone who 
came to see him politely (Shu Er, 7). 
Although Confucius called himself the person who loves to learn (Gong Ye 
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Chang, 27), he said that Yen Hui was the only one of his disciples who loves to 
learn. He said: “One of the conditions to love learning is not repeating a fault 
like Yen Hui” (Yong Ye, 2) and “It is a fault that one does not correct one’s 
faults” (Wei Ling Gong, 29). And he also stated: “Do not mind correcting a 
fault” (Xue Er, 8; Zi Lu, 24). According to him, the attitude to try to achieve 
self-improvement by reflecting on the self and correcting one’s faults is the 
criteria to evaluate the value of a person. This shows evidently Confucius’ 
understanding of human beings as an entity with infinite possibility and 
plasticity. 
Confucius’ position emphasizing the core value of learning and teaching 
in the process of self-improvement was followed by Mencius and Xunzi. 
According to Mencius, because any one possesses from birth the Intuitive 
Knowledge that he/she has all the beginnings of morality and the Intuitive 
Ability to practice them in daily life, he/she should reflect on his/her 
shortcomings and improve them until reaching to an ideal state people can 
achieve (Mencius, Jin Xin I, 15). He argued: “If human beings realize and 
expand their own innate good beginnings, anyone can become a Sage” (Gao 
Zi II, 2) 
Xunzi also identified humans as beings with infinite possibilities as 
Confucius did. This can be reasoned easily from his conceptions of human 
nature and self-cultivation. According to him, human beings possess innate 
abilities to perceive their original morality and to practice them in daily living 
(Xunzi, Zhengming, 3), and thus, they can reach to the state of a Superior 
Man, an ideal state of a person, through learning and practicing Propriety, the 
supreme regulative system of the Way, with these innate capabilities (Rongru, 
31-32; Xing’e, 2-3, 13-14). This reveals well Xunzi’s proposition that human 
beings are not defined as having fixed and complete attributes, but as having 
infinite capabilities and possibility to become.
As expressed evidently in the above statements, Confucians identify the 
value of human beings in their future states of becoming, rather than in their 
past achievements, fixed attributes they have got.  This position to understand 
humans in their future becoming, together with the view of humans as social 
and moral beings, comprises the whole system of Confucian’s perspectives on 
human beings.
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(2) Emphasis on Self-improvement
The position to understand humans as a plastic and variable being with 
possibility of future becoming originates from the perspective that human 
beings possess the capacity for moral awareness and practice. This is the basis 
of belief in the ability to change, which means that human beings are able to 
perceive and perform constantly changing roles and responsibilities in the 
network of varying social relations. In addition, this is the basis for the belief 
in the capability to change through which human beings accomplish self-
improvement by finding out and correcting their shortcomings and faults. 
Therefore, the emphasis on human beings’ possibility to change and efforts to 
accomplish self-improvement come from the position to understand humans 
as beings to have this possibility to change. This position is consistent with 
that of collectivistic cultures, which highlight the capability to meet the needs 
of situational change, contrary to individualistic cultures, which emphasizes 
consistent psychological and behavioral stability in the aspect of variability 
dimension, as depicted at the third row of Table 1.
2.  Confucian Understandings of Psychology and Their Collectivistic 
Features 
The author proposed the framework for comparison the differences between 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures in three aspects (focus of  attention, 
object to control, and variability) in Table 1, and reviewed the differences 
between these two cultures with this framework and found the differences in 
psychological and behavioral tendencies, such as interpersonal assessment, 
attribution, emotion, and motivation between these two cultures, are 
consistent with the anticipations of the framework. Then in above section, 
the author made it clear that the emphasis on connectedness and harmony, 
self-restraint, and variability and self-improvement observed in collectivistic 
cultures are exactly congruent with the Confucian view of human beings, 
which identify humans as social beings, active moral subjects, and beings 
with possibility, respectively. From these results, the conjecture that 
Confucian system has acted as the leading guard to flourish collectivistic 
culture in East Asian society gets full support. Now, the author will search for 
the theories of cognition (interpersonal assessment and attribution), emotion, 
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and motivation derived from the Confucian classics, and explore if the 
features appeared in these Confucian theories have logical congruence with 
characteristics found in collectivistic cultures, so as to ascertain, once more, 
on a firm theoretical and empirical ground that Confucianism has been the 
intellectual background of East Asian collectivism.
 
1) Confucian Theory of Social Cognition and Its Collectivistic Characteristics
Contrary to the traditions of Western philosophy since ancient Greece, 
which have understood the structure of human psychology based on three 
constituent system of cognition, emotion, and motivation with special 
emphasis on rationality (cognition), Confucians understand the structure of 
human psychology based on four constituent system of morality, cognition, 
emotion, and motivation, and they assert that morality must integrate and 
control the other structural elements of psychology. The Superior Man is 
the person who achieves the state in which morality integrates and controls 
all the rest constituents of his/her mindset. As the Superior Man is the ideal 
human type put forth by Confucians, he/she would become the standard 
against which Confucians evaluate the value of a person and the level he/
she arrived. Therefore, on what criteria the Superior Man assesses persons 
and from which elements he searches for the causes of his actions become 
the prototypic model of Confucian theory of social cognition (interpersonal 
assessment and attribution). In this context, we can extract social cognition 
theory originating from Confucianism from the character and attributional 
style of the Superior Man.14
In the Analects, Confucius suggested three types of the Superior Man: 
one who improves the self and achieves the perfection of character by self-
cultivation through reverential carefulness; one who promotes harmony 
with others based on the perfection of character; and one who succors all the 
people based on the perfection of character (Xian Wen, 45). In the Mencius, 
Mencius suggested three types of the Sage: one who achieves the perfection 
of character and maintains one’s purity; one who promotes harmony in social 
relationships; and one who takes on and fulfills social responsibility (Wan 
Zhang II, 1). In the Xunzi, Xunzi seeks features of the Superior Man and 
14 Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2003: chapter 6; 2007: chapter 3).
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the Sage in four aspects: self-cultivation, problem-centered attitude in work 
situation, interpersonal harmony, and the acceptance of social responsibility 
(Jundao, 6-7). In the Great Learning, three rules—residing in the state of 
ultimate good, loving the people and caring for them, and illustrating one’s 
innate virtue to enable all people to realize that they are their own moral 
subjects—were put forth as the ultimate goal of great learning. 
Improving the self and achieving perfection of character through 
cultivating oneself (Confucius); maintaining the purity of one’s character 
(Mencius); cultivating oneself and having problem-centered attitudes in 
working situations (Xunzi); and residing in the state of ultimate good (the 
Great Learning): All of these refer to personal features of the ideal persons 
(the Superior Man and the Sage) in terms of their personal becoming as 
moral subjects. Promoting harmony with others in interpersonal relations 
(Concius, Mencius, and Xunzi); and loving the people and caring for them 
(the Great Learning): These are features of the ideal persons in terms of their 
social relationships with others as social beings. Succoring all the people 
who live together in this world (Confucius); accepting and fulfilling social 
responsibilities (Mencius and Xunzi); and teaching and illustrating people 
to realize that they are their own moral subjects (the Great Learning): These 
demonstrate features of the ideal persons in terms of their performing social 
responsibilities they have got in the course of living together in this social 
world. Therefore, Confucianism describes the ideal image of human beings 
in three aspects: self-completion via self-cultivation, promotion of peace and 
amity in interpersonal relationships, and acceptance and fulfillment of social 
responsibilities.
(1)  Acceptance of Social Responsibilities and Emphasis on Connectedness/
Harmony
The Superior Man who achieves perfection of character through self-
cultivation does not develop harmony only with people around him, such as 
family, relatives, or friends. He thinks that the purpose of humans’ existence as 
social beings is in the acceptance and fulfillment of social responsibilities. And 
he tries to teach all people in the world the Way of humanity (benevolence) 
and righteousness and leads them to follow this Way. Thus, he assumes that 
succoring all the people is responsibilities assigned by Heaven, and that 
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he should accept and try to fulfill them willingly. Confucius expressed this 
feature of the Superior Man as follows: The Superior Man who achieves moral 
self-improvement through self-cultivation does not stop at self-cultivation 
and caring for others. He is interested in the whole society, leads people to the 
state of moral awareness, and makes them feel more comfortable (Analects, 
Xian Wen, 45; Gong Ye Chang, 15; Yan Yuan 1, 16; Wei Ling Gong, 17; Zi 
Chang, 3). That is, the Superior Man is aware that the self relates to all other 
people, maintains a harmonious life with them, and takes responsibilities to 
succor them all. 
Mencius said that “the Superior Man takes upon himself the heavy charge 
of the whole world” (Mencius, Wan Zhang I, 7; Wang Zhang II, 1). He tries 
to take upon  himself the heavy responsibilities of saving a chaotic society 
and protecting people around him, and to meet these responsibilities with 
determination (Gong Sun Chou I, 2; Gong Sun Chou II, 2; Wan Zhang I, 6, 
7; Wan Zhang II, 1; Gao Zi II, 6; Jin Xin I, 31; Jin Xin II, 38). Xunzi said that 
the Superior Man respects older people and deals with younger people with 
propriety; does not try to compete with others; performs their own social 
responsibilities; assists others in meeting their responsibilities; and therefore 
develops connectedness and harmony among people (Xunzi, Jundao, 6-7). In 
the Great Learning, these features of the Superior Man enable all the people to 
live in harmonious and peaceful World through enabling them to realize that 
they themselves are moral subjects. 
Overall, the Superior Man achieves moral perfection of character; leads 
people around him to feel comfortable; develops connectedness with all the 
people of the world; takes responsibilities to lead and succor them; and meets 
these responsibilities in everyday life. He lives with strong connections with 
others, focuses on developing harmony in the course of life, and takes social 
responsibilities. 
As evidently shown up to now, the core feature of the character of the 
Superior Man is the acceptance of social responsibilities. This feature originates 
from the understanding of human existence as “social beings”; the Superior 
Man understands human beings in their “connection” with others and 
accomplishes “harmony” with them. The Superior Man considers relationship 
with others as representing the meaning of human existence and highlights 
sociality in the course of life. Therefore, Confucians assert that people always 
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need to achieve and maintain harmonious connections with others, and to 
take upon themselves social responsibilities. In this context, it is clear that 
“taking and completing social responsibilities in everyday life” produces 
“connectedness” and “harmony” in social relations, which collectivists in East 
Asia emphasize in the aspect of the focus of attention as depicted in Table 
1. Here we can confirm a basis of the argument that the background of East 
Asian collectivism lies in the Confucian system. 
(2)  Promotion of Peace/Amity in Interpersonal Relationships and Emphasis 
on Self-restraint
Confucius said that the Superior Man can promote harmony with others after 
cultivating himself with reverential carefulness (Analects, Xian Wen, 45); and 
highlighted the attitude of the Superior Man to live with others harmoniously 
in his daily life (Wei Zheng, 14; Yan Yuan, 5; Zi Lu, 23; Wei Ling Gong, 21; 
Yang Huo 4, 24). According to Confucius, the Superior Man with moral self-
cultivation is involved not only in self-improvement, but also in leading 
people around him to a state of moral awareness by building harmonious and 
comfortable relationships with them.
Mencius identified these features as those of the Sage who promotes 
harmony in interpersonal relations (Mencius, Wang Zhang II, 1). Mencius 
suggested that such an ideal person like Hui of Liu-Hsia (the prototypic Sage 
of harmony) can embrace all people,  because he makes peaceful relations 
with any other persons and receives them with attitudes of amity and 
harmony (Gong Sun Chou I, 2; Wang Zhang II, 1; Gaozi II, 6; Jinxin I, 22; 
Jinxin II, 15). Xunzi addressed that the Superior Man embraces all the people 
in interpersonal relationships, guides them with righteousness so that they 
do not feel confused, and attains harmony among them (Xunzi, Chendao, 
6-7). In the Great Learning, these features of the Superior Man are the second 
purpose of great learning, which was termed loving the people, i.e. after 
achieving moral perfection, sharing it with people so as to attain harmonious 
relationships. Therefore, in Confucian classics, following Confucius’ idea 
that the Superior Man promotes with and gives rest to all the people after 
attaining self-cultivation, developing harmony in interpersonal relationships 
was set forth as one of the features of the ideal person. 
The reason why the Superior Man can develop harmony in interpersonal 
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relationships is that he is interested in others in making relationships with 
them, considers others first, embraces a wide range of people, and inhibits 
his own self. Confucius addressed: “Humanity (benevolence) means loving 
others” (Analects, Yan Yuan, 22); “Humanity is not doing unto others that 
which I would not want to be done to myself ” (Yan Yuan, 2; Wei Ling Gong, 
23); and “Humanity is establishing others first if you want to establish 
yourself, and letting others achieve first if you want to achieve” (Yong Ye, 
28). In these statements, Confucius asserted that considering others first and 
inhibiting the self are shortcuts to develop harmony with others.
Mencius assumed that having the attitude of concern for and compassion 
on others makes it possible for a person “to influence others through self-
inhibition” (Mencius, Liang Hui Wang I, 7), and “to be with others whether 
they were happy or not” (Liang Hui Wang II, 4). Xunzi suggested that to have 
concern for and compassion on others leads “to embrace others generously.” 
According to Xunzi, embracing others generously is one of the features of the 
Superior Man. The Superior Man inhibits the self and embraces all the people, 
including who are lazy, foolish, uneducated, and impure (Xunzi, Feixiang, 
17), as the Superior Man “understands others from his own standards” 
(Feixiang, 13). In the Great Learning, “understanding others on the basis of 
the self ” (the Great Learning, 10) was identified as the core of developing 
harmony in interpersonal relationships. The Superior Man embraces all the 
people with the attitude of putting themselves in the position of others, shows 
interest in others, considers others first, inhibits the self, and finally develops 
harmonious interpersonal relationships. 
The argument to posit harmonious interpersonal relationships as 
the second feature of the Superior Man is derived from the Confucians’ 
conception of human beings as active moral subjects. Because the Superior 
Man realizes fully that others also possess the same morality, needs, 
preferences, and emotions as his, it is possible for him to inhibit his own self 
and to consider others first in interpersonal relationships. In this context, it is 
evident that building and maintaining harmonious relationships with others 
would produce “the attitudes of self-restraint,” which East Asian collectivists 
stress in the aspect of the object to control as depicted in Table 1. Here we 
can validate another basis of the argument that the background of East Asian 
collectivism lies in the Confucian system.    
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(3)  Encouragement of Self-cultivation and Emphasis on Flexibility/Self-
improvement
Confucius stated that “The Superior Man is a person who cultivates himself 
in reverential carefulness” (Analects, Xian Wen, 45), so the most important 
feature of the Superior Man is to be aware of the fact that he himself is 
the subject of morality and to practice these innate moralities in daily life 
through self-cultivation. Because the Superior Man achieves self-cultivation 
through practicing humanity (benevolence) and righteousness in daily life, 
he/she does not mind correcting himself/herself when he/she has a fault (Xue 
Er, 8). He tries to imitate a good person when he encounters one, and he 
reflects upon and improves himself when he encounters a person who is not 
good (Li Ren, 17). The Superior Man is able to correct his faults and improve 
himself because he seeks all responsibilities in himself as a moral subject. 
As the Superior Man always improves himself and seeks all responsibilities 
in himself, he is emotionally stable (Yan Yuan, 4), and is able to inhibit his 
selfish desires (Xue Er, 14). Therefore, Confucius viewed the variability and 
self-improvement of human beings as the essential feature of self-cultivation.   
Confucius identified “to achieve moral self-perfection through self-
cultivation” as the first feature of the Superior Man. Mencius viewed this state 
as that of the “Sage who secures the self purely and achieves self-perfection” 
(Mencius, Wan Zhang II, 1), and referred to Po Yi as its prototype. Mencius 
suggested that Po Yi was the Superior Man who continued to conduct the 
Way innocently in his whole life through self-cultivation (Gong Sun Chou I, 
2, 9; Li Lou I, 13; Wan Zhang II, 1; Gaozi II, 6; Jin Xin I, 22; Jin Xin II, 15); 
maintained humanity (benevolence) and followed righteousness (Jin Xin 
I, 15); and accomplished self-perfection. Xunzi sought the features of the 
Superior Man who achieved self-perfection in the aspects of “self-cultivation” 
and “problem-centeredness in work situations” (Xunzi, Jundao, 6-7). 
According to Xunzi, this feature of the Superior Man is achieved through 
moral self-perfection through self-improvement, which are consistent with 
Confucius’ and Mencius’ positions. In the Great Learning, “residing in the 
state of ultimate good”, as one of the three rules to practice the Way, refers 
to the state of moral self-perfection through self-improvement and self-
cultivation. In this context, to achieve moral self-perfection through self-
cultivation is one of the basic features of the Superior Man derived from all of 
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the Confucian classics.
The basic precondition for self-improvement is to understand certainly 
that human beings, as moral subjects, are equipped with all the basis of 
morality innately (Analects, Yong Ye, 28; Yan Yuan, 1; Mencius, Li Lou II, 14; 
Gaozi II, 6; Xunzi, Tianlun, 28-29). Because the Superior Man understands 
very well that he is an innate moral subject, he has strong attitudes to seek all 
the responsibilities of his actions in himself (Analects, Xue Er 16, Yong Ye 14; 
Xian Wen 32; Wei Ling Gong 18, 20; Mencius, Li Lou I 4; Jin Xin I 4; Xunzi, 
Faxing 21-22). As the Superior Man has a strong tendency to attribute all the 
causes of his actions to himself, he is not hesitant in correcting their faults so 
as to achieve self-improvement (Analects, Xue Er, 8; Li Ren, 17; Zi Zhang, 21; 
Mencius, Gong Sun Chou I, 9; Gong Sun Chou II, 8; Xunzi, Quanxue, 2). 
As mentioned above, the Superior Man is the person who understands 
deeply that all the beginnings of morality are endowed within himself from 
birth, thus, on the basis of this firm understanding, his tendency to correct 
his own faults through seeking all the responsibilities in himself is derived. 
He discriminates correctly what he should do from what he should not 
do (Analects, Yan Yuan, 1; Mencius, Li Lou II, 8; Zin Xin I, 17, 44; Xunzi, 
Tianlun, 25). He also takes care of his business in daily life in accordance 
with moral values (Xunzi, Jiebi, 17). What he, as moral subject, needs to do 
is to inhibit and control his selfish biological desires and personal emotions, 
which are induced and fulfilled according to extraneous contextual elements, 
and accordingly he pursues exclusively keeping and increasing morally based 
other-oriented emotions and motives. In this way, the Superior Man tries to 
improve himself through self-control and self-constraint in order to achieve 
self-perfection. 
Self-cultivation, one of the basic features of the Superior Man, mirrors 
the Confucian belief in the “infinite possibilities of change” of human beings. 
This self-cultivation is brought about through endless personal effort. In this 
context, it is evident that “self-perfection through self-cultivation,” a feature 
of the Superior Man, should induce “flexible change” and “self-improvement,” 
which East Asian collectivists focus on in the aspect of variability of human 
existence as depicted in Table 1. Here we can validate yet another basis of 
the argument that the background of  East Asian collectivism lies in the 
Confucian system.   
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2) Confucian Theory of Emotion and Its Collectivistic Characteristics
Pre-Qin Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi viewed human 
emotions as having a negative influence on desirable adjustment and 
therefore needing to be regulated and controlled through vigorous self-
cultivation. These emotions which need to be controlled are ego-focused ones 
provoked by extraneous conditions as the Seven Passions (joy, anger, sorrow, 
fear, love, hate, and lust) (Liji, Liyun, 301).15 But emotions which are other-
directed in their orientation and are helpful for moral cultivation like the 
Four Beginnings must be recommended rather than inhibited. 
Mencius asserted that human beings have Four Beginnings, which 
constitute the essential goodness of humans, innately, and recommended 
expanding these virtues. This point plays a unique role in understanding 
emotions in pre-Qin Confucianism. The Four Beginnings are the followings: 
compassion to feel sorry for people in trouble; being shameful when 
self and others are not quite right; yielding to and respecting others; and 
discriminating between right and wrong. These Four Beginnings can be seen 
as social emotions (Chung, Y. 1970: 86-90; Hahn, D. 1994: 108-134, 221-
222) which are aroused in association with the moral principles (norms) of 
human life, and will be the full-flourished virtues (humanity [benevolence], 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, respectively) through self-cultivation.
According to the theoretical system of pre-Qin Confucianism, the Four 
Beginnings are the most representatives of other-directed or normative 
emotions. These are autonomous and endogenous emotions which arise from 
either one’s own moral cultivation or from interest in and concern about 
others’ well-being. Because these emotions are provoked and satisfied in 
accordance with what people do in the course of self-cultivation, Confucians 
encourage and emphasize people to experience and expand these emotions. 
That is, to expand the innate other-directed or norm-based emotions, like 
the Four Beginnings, so as to make them full-flourish in daily life, is one 
of the basic features of Confucian theory of emotion, and, according to 
15 This refers to page 301, Liji jinzhu jinyi (Taibei: Shāngwùyìnshūguǎn) by Wang 
Mengou (1969). From now on, citation of Liji (The Book of Ritual) will follow this 
example.
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Confucianism, this is a core way to cultivate one’s self.
By contrast, the Seven Passions are assumed to be extraneous emotions 
which are provoked by outside conditions. These are ego-focused emotions 
which are induced by comparing extraneous conditions with one’s own 
situations. For example, “joy” is induced when extraneous conditions are 
positive for the satisfaction of personal needs, while “anger” is induced when 
they are negative. Confucians asserted that the inducement and satisfaction of 
these emotions depends on extraneous conditions, so these emotions need to 
be controlled and vigorously regulated in daily life, because free expressions of 
these emotions are very likely to harm harmony in interpersonal relationships 
and to make persons lose their composure. Thus, to lay great emphasis upon 
the inhibition and regulation of ego-oriented emotions, like Seven Passions, 
is another feature of the Confucian theory of emotion. 
As mentioned above, the core processes of Confucian self-cultivation lay 
in the emphasis on experiencing and expanding the Four Beginnings (other-
directed or norm-based emotions) and on inhibiting and controlling the 
Seven Passions (ego-focused emotions). According to Confucianism, through 
regulation of these two types of emotions (expanding Four Beginnings 
and inhibiting Seven Passions), human beings can get away from personal 
limitations and are then free to achieve emotional sublimation and self-
improvement, and eventually reach to the state of moral self-perfection. This 
emphasis on the sublimation of emotions through emotional regulation is 
one another features of Confucian theory of emotion. 
In pre-Qin Confucianism, other-directed or norm-based emotions which 
are provoked in social situations need to be pursued and expanded, whereas 
ego-centered emotions which are induced in accordance with extraneous 
conditions and urge to fulfill individual selfish needs must be vigorously 
regulated and controlled; for Confucians, this double-edged standard is the 
kernel to deal with emotional problems. In this context, it is evident that the 
core of self-cultivation suggested by pre-Qin Confucianism is to expand the 
Four Beginnings and to inhibit the Seven Passions. 
This position of pre-Qin Confucianism has continued as an essence 
of contemporary Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism, established as a 
metaphysical system in theoretical competition against Buddhism and Daoism, 
inherited this position. The Confucians of Chosŏn dynasty (1392~1910) 
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took over the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi, but the Neo-Confucians of 
the Chosŏn dynasty was more strongly obsessed with this double-edged 
understanding of emotions than those of China. 
Neo-Confucians in the Chosŏn dynasty systematized Confucian theory 
of emotion with full uniqueness through the Four-Seven Debate, a debate on 
the nature of and relations between Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions, 
which went on continuously for approximately three hundred years. This 
Four-Seven Debate was “the accomplishment of continuous exploration 
from the mid-16th century to the end of the Chosŏn dynasty” (Yoon, S. 1997: 
6). This had been a representative question in the Neo-Confucianism of the 
Chosŏn dynasty because almost every Confucian at that time participated in 
this debate. In this context, the author will review questions to understand 
emotions in the Neo-Confucianism of the Chosŏn dynasty and verify clearly 
that East Asian collectivistic culture originates from Confucianism.16
(1)  Encouragement of the Four Beginnings and Emphasis on Connectedness/
Harmony
The first goal of the Four-Seven Debate is to prove theoretically and 
realistically that peoples have good nature from birth, which can be developed 
and realized actually in their process of living. Confucians’ belief in the 
“goodness” of human nature comes from the fact that the Four Beginnings 
16 The Four-Seven Debate of Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism tried to understand the 
framework of igi-ron (theory of principles [I] and materials [Gi] of human mind) 
by connecting the Four Beginnings and Seven Passions to the theory of good 
and evil. Some critics have contended that it is difficult to conduct psychological 
evidence-based research with this topic. Additionally, there are different opinions 
about whether discriminating what is right from what is wrong, one of the Four 
Beginnings, is regarded as an emotion or not. However, the Four Beginnings have 
been understood traditionally by comparing with the Seven Passions, which are 
emotions aroused in seven representative real-life situations. Therefore, it is evident 
that the Four Beginnings have been regarded as the core of other-directed and norm-
based social emotions (Chung, Y. 1970; Han, D. 1994). Aside from the philosophical 
issues of igi-ron, the author identifies the Four-Seven Theory only as the basic 
reference of Confucian theory of emotion. The fundamental position of Four-Seven 
Theory in this paper is consistent with theory of emotion extracted from texts of pre-
Qin Confucians. Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2003: chapter 7; 2007: 
chapter 4).
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are endowed to humans innately. On this foundation, Confucians try to seek 
the way to develop and realize one’s natural goodness in the possibility of 
inhibiting one’s self-centered selfishness represented in the Seven Passions. 
Viewing from this point, it is no exaggeration to say that the theoretical as 
well as realistic ground of the Four-Seven Debate lies in the strong attitudes 
of humanism and respects for the human development (Yoon, S. 1992: 8). 
Confucians in the mid-Chosŏn dynasty including Yi Hwang (T’oegye) and 
Yi I (Yulgok) participated in the debate on the origins and the relationship 
between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Passions, expressing different 
opinions. However, they agreed on the point that the Four Beginnings are 
originally pure goodness itself. T’oegye argued: “The Four Beginnings are 
derived from the nature of human mind, such as humanity (benevolence), 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, whereas the Seven Passions are 
provoked by extraneous objects and conditions, that is, extraneous objects 
and conditions stimulate our senses and bring about the Seven Passions” 
(T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406).17 Therefore, “the Four Beginnings are all goodness 
itself ” (406, 412). In addition, Yulgok viewed “compassion for others in 
trouble” as the pure good in such emotions as joy, sorrow, love, and lust; 
“shame about doing wrong” as the pure good in anger and in hate; and 
“yielding to others” as the pure good in fear. “Discriminating between right 
and wrong” is also all pure good, as it involves knowing what is right and 
what is wrong with regard to the Seven Passions (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 199).18 This 
position is consistent with T’oegye’s opinion. 
As the Four Beginnings are other-oriented (“compassion to feel sorry 
for others in trouble” and “yielding to and respecting others”) or based on 
moral norms and principles (“being shameful about doing wrong” and 
“discriminating between right and wrong”), these emotions originate from 
the innate nature of human beings and are pure and good; thus these are 
encouraged strongly by Confucians. The other- and norm-oriented Four 
17 This refers to page 406 in Book 1 of the T’oegye chŏnsŏ, which was published by 
Academy of East Asian Studies (1958), Sung Kyun Kwan University. From now on, 
citation of T’oegye will follow this example.
18 This refers to page 199 in Yulgok chŏnsŏ, which was published by Academy of East 
Asian Studies (1958), Sung Kyun Kwan University. From now on, citation of Yulgok 
will follow this example.
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Beginnings are the most representative emotions directly derived from the 
position of understanding humans as “social beings.” 
The position of understanding humans as social beings leads to the view 
that responsibilities and obligations laid in interpersonal situations are 
regarded as the impetus for social action, and the goal of any social actions 
is to attain order and harmony in social relationships. This is consistent with 
the position of collectivism that emphasizes connectedness and harmony 
with others. In Confucianism, the Superior Man, a model of ideal person, has 
described as having compassion upon and feeling concern about others and 
society. Therefore, his focus of attention is concentrated on others or society 
rather than on his own self. Consequently, he seeks standards of interpersonal 
assessment in whether peoples have compassion upon and concern about 
others or not. This tendency produces the attitude that stresses and promotes 
“other-directed emotions”, such as the “Four Beginnings” and “shame.”
The position of Confucianism to consider humans as social beings 
induces the features of collectivistic culture (impetus for social actions = 
responsibilities and obligations laid in the relational networks; goals of social 
actions = to attain connectedness and harmony; focus of attention = others 
and society) in the aspect of impetus and goals for actions (focus of attention) 
as depicted in Table 1. The fact that Confucian theory of emotion highlights 
“encouraging other- and norm-oriented emotions” indicates the fact that 
Confucianism is the background of the development of collectivistic culture 
in East Asian society, in where this theoretical system has dominated people’s 
daily life for a very long time. 
(2) Inhibition of the Seven Passions and Emphasis on Self-restraint
Neo-Confucians of the Chosŏn dynasty all agreed that the Seven Passions are 
a mixture of good and evil and can easily slide towards evil. T’oegye posited: 
“Because the Seven Passions are provoked by the stimuli in extraneous 
conditions, they are indecisive to be good or bad” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406); or 
“They are originally good, but easily become evil” (412). He asserted that if 
the arousal of the Seven Passions loses li (principle), they become evil; and 
this is one of the reasons why human beings become evil. 
Yulgok asserted that the Four Beginnings are all pure good, but the 
Seven Passions are mixed with good and evil. He stated: “Whereas the Four 
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Beginnings represent only pure goodness, the Seven Passions represent 
both selfish mind and good mind” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 199). The Seven Passions 
which are mixtures of good and evil tend to flow toward evil, if peoples fail 
to differentiate between when they need to feel these emotions (joy, anger, 
sorrow, fear, love, hate, and lust) and when they should not feel (199).
As the Seven Passions have the possibility to make people become evil, 
Neo-Confucians asserted that the Seven Passions needed to be suppressed. 
Why do these Seven Passions tend to become evil? It is because they are 
exogenous emotions which are provoked if extraneous conditions, including 
other persons, are favorable to meet one’s aspirations, expectations, or needs 
(in this case, one feels joy, love, or lust) or not (in this case, one feels anger, 
sorrow, fear, or hate); that is, because the Seven Passions are ego-centered 
and selfish in nature. In this regard, Neo-Confucians agreed that ego-
centered selfish emotions like the Seven Passions hinder a person from or 
have negative influence on developing one’s natural goodness and improving 
oneself, so these harmful emotions need to be controlled and inhibited. 
According to the Confucian thought, every person can control and 
inhibit the ego-centered Seven Passions, because he/she is fully aware of 
the meaning of human existence as moral subjects and is equipped with 
autonomous capacities to practice and expand his/her innate moral basis 
(the Four Beginnings) in daily life; that is, human beings as “autonomous 
moral subjects” can control and inhibit one’s selfishness emanating from ego-
centered “Seven Passions.”
The position of considering human beings as autonomous moral subjects 
highlights the attribution of the causes of one’s social actions to his/her innate 
moralities. This position is consistent with a collectivistic culture’s stress on 
self-restraint in the mode of expressing the self. Viewing from this point, 
all the causes of one’s actions reside on the self as a moral subject; therefore, 
human beings should attribute responsibilities and reasons of their actions 
to themselves. And also, the responsibility to maintain order and harmony in 
society and interpersonal relationships depends on oneself. This is why the 
self rather than external contextual conditions are rising up as the target to 
control, and consequently, constant self-restraint is highlighted as the way of 
self-cultivation in Confucian thought. In this context, Confucians’ tendency 
to emphasize self-restraint and self-control is conspicuous in the aspect of 
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emotion. Since Confucians understand that the provoking and satisfying 
conditions of ego-centered emotions reside in the extraneous situation, they 
assert these feelings, such as the Seven Passions that hinder self-cultivation, 
should be vigorously inhibited and controlled. 
From this position of Confucians to view human beings as autonomous 
moral subjects, arises the collectivistic features (mode of expressing self = self-
restraint; object to control = self) in East Asian society, whose characteristics 
are consistent with those of the aspect of the mode of self-expression (the 
target to control) depicted in Table 1. In this context, we can induce another 
evidence proving the fact that in the theoretical background of East Asian 
collectivism lies the Confucianism, which conceives person as an autonomous 
moral being and emphasizes inhibiting self-centered feelings, especially the 
Seven Passions, in its theory of emotion.
(3) Sublimation of Emotions and Emphasis on Self-improvement
The core of Confucian theory of emotion is in the inhibition of ego-centered 
feelings such as the Seven Passions and in the encouragement of other-
directed and norm-based emotions such as the Four Beginnings. Confucians 
assume that these control and regulation of emotions are the kernel of self-
cultivation, through which one can improve oneself. The fundamental goal 
of Confucianism, especially Neo-Confucianism, is in learning the way to be a 
Superior Man through abandoning human greed (selfishness) and pursuing 
the principles of Heaven (morality). Neo-Confucians suggested Kŏgyŏng 
(residing in reverential carefulness) as a basic way to abandon human greed 
and to pursue the principles of Heaven. This is “a mind control strategy to 
maintain the state of Gyŏng (reverence)” (Hahn, D. 1994: 76). T’oegye and 
Yulgok viewed “Gyŏng as the essence of both the beginning and the end of 
learning the way to be a Superior Man” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 210; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 
431), because “Gyŏng is the controller of the mind and the basis of all affairs” 
(T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203). 
Neo-Confucians asserted that the way to control and to regulate human 
emotions can be achieved by “Kŏgyŏng,” as “Kŏgyŏng” embraces the whole 
process of achieving self-control of the mind. According to Confucian 
logic, this control and regulation of human emotions in the state of Kŏgyŏng 
enables one to inhibit the Seven Passions which are “indecisive in choosing 
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good or evil” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406) and “likely to be evil” (412). In other 
words, Kŏgyŏng enables the sublimation of emotions come true by inhibiting 
the Seven Passions and encouraging the Four Beginnings in daily life, and 
so leads people to the state of pure goodness. Chung, Yang Eun (1970, 86-
90) asserted that the roles of the Four Beginnings as social emotions are most 
important in the course of emotional regulations; because, even though the 
Seven Passions are provoked, if the effect of the Four Beginnings is powerful 
enough, then the Seven Passions would be diminished automatically. In other 
words, he proposed that one should not respond to others’ physical existence 
(in this case, the Seven Passions are provoked), but should rather respond 
to others’ psychological aspects as social stimuli (in this case, the Four 
Beginnings are aroused). Anyway, Confucians emphasized the sublimation 
of emotions through arousing the Four Beginnings instead of provoking 
the Seven Passions in daily social relations; and, according to the Neo-
Confucians, the only way to achieve the emotional sublimation is the method 
of Kŏgyŏng.
Confucians, especially Neo-Confucians, highlighted the value of emotional 
sublimation, to make the other-directed and norm-based emotions are the 
controller of all the emotional responses by inhibiting the Seven Passions 
and encouraging the Four Beginnings, in the process of self-cultivation 
and self-improvement through Kŏgyŏng practice (residing in reverential 
carefulness in everyday life). All Neo-Confucians participating in the Four-
Seven Debate agreed on this position. Neo-Confucians’ assertion on the 
possibility “to sublimate emotions through Kŏgyŏng” is derived directly from 
their perspectives on humans as “beings with infinite plasticity (variability) to 
become a Superior Man.”
The Confucian understanding of humans as having infinite possibilities 
is based on the perspective which emphasizes human capacity to perform 
their constantly varying roles and responsibilities in the networks of social 
relationships; and this belief in human changeability is represented as it is in 
the Confucian theory of emotion, which stresses emotional regulation in daily 
life. Viewing from this Confucian perspective, human beings are supposed 
to make every effort to improve themselves through self-reflection on their 
weaknesses and faults and correcting them in daily life; thus, self-cultivation 
and self-improvement are raised as important standards of interpersonal 
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assessment. In addition, Confucians highlight emotional sublimation 
(inhibiting ego-centered emotions such as the Seven Passions and trying to 
make other-directed and norm-based emotions such as the Four Beginnings 
be the dominant emotions) in the process of endless self-improvement, 
which are consistent with the characteristics found in East Asian collectivistic 
cultures.
The Confucian theory of emotion, which encourages to control and 
regulate emotions, has strong coherence with the features of collectivistic 
cultures in respect that this cultures accept and stress human changeability; in 
this respect, it is evident that these Confucian views bring about the features 
of collectivistic cultures (appreciating flexible change with varying contexts 
rather than stable consistency; encouraging to improve one’s weaknesses 
rather than enhancing one’s strengths as the chief way for self-advancement) 
in the aspect of human variability as depicted in Table 1. This is yet another 
point proving the proposition that Confucianism lies in the theoretical 
background of East Asian collectivism. 
3) Confucian Theory of Motivation and Its Collectivistic Characteristics
The motivation theory of pre-Qin Confucians can be summarized in terms 
of the following three features: First, humans possess a number of motives, 
such as biological, sensual, selfish, and moral motives; and among them, 
only moral motives enable humans to control themselves, so they are the 
most essential for humans; Second, not only does the satisfaction of motives 
other than moral ones depend on extraneous conditions, but also pleasure 
from the satisfaction of these motives leads people to lose righteousness, so 
these motives must be controlled and inhibited; Third, moral motives not 
only are the most essential ones to enable human beings to control the self 
with, but also are located in the supreme position of the hierarchy of motives; 
thus, other subordinate motives should be governed by the moral motives; 
Being free from the constraints of these subordinate motives and making 
moral ones dominate one’s life (sublimation of motivation) is the chief way to 
become an ideal human being. 
Neo-Confucians inherited this theory of motivation from pre-Qin 
Confucians. However, Neo-Confucians laid more emphasis on the features 
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of evilness of biological and selfish motives, and they demonstrated a stricter 
proposition in focusing on absolute control of them with moral motives. The 
core of the theory of motivation suggested by Neo-Confucians, especially 
those in the Chosŏn dynasty, lies in the theory of the Human Mind (source of 
selfish desires) and the Moral Mind (source of moral motives). The essential 
points of this theory are as follows: Encouragement and development of the 
moral motives; Inhibition and control of the selfish desires; and Sublimation 
of motivation through Kŏgyŏng.19
(1)  Encouragement of the Moral Motives and Emphasis on Connectedness/ 
Harmony
The fundamental reasoning of the Neo-Confucian theory of the Human Mind 
and the Moral Mind is that the Human Mind is the basis of the selfish desires 
derived from biological features, while the Moral Mind is the innate human 
nature from which originating  the moral motives. Every human being, no 
matter who he or she is, has these two kinds of motives. T’oegye addressed: 
“The Human Mind causes strivings for external objects to satisfy one’s 
biological and selfish desires, whereas the Moral Mind causes strivings for 
innate righteousness and li (principle)” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208). This statement 
points out clearly that biological and selfish desires are based on the Human 
Mind, and moral motives are based on the Moral Mind. Yulgok expressed the 
same proposition and “identified the need for pleasant sounds, colors, scents, 
19 There are some controversies as to whether the theory of the Human Mind and Moral 
Mind is regarded as a theory of motivation or not. In particular, the Moral Mind is 
the basis for the Four Beginnings, and the Human Mind is the basis for the Seven 
Passions. Therefore, this theory can be considered as a theory of emotion. Neo-
Confucians such as T’oegye and Yulgok agreed that the Human Mind is based on the 
biological and selfish needs, and so leads the behavior to let oneself ahead of others; 
while, the Moral Mind is oriented toward goodness, and so leads the action to practice 
moral motives with and for others. In this context, both the Human Mind and the 
Moral Mind have the features of originating and invoking human actions, which is 
the chief characteristics of the definition of motivation; therefore, the theory of the 
Human Mind and the Moral Mind can be considered as the fundamental axis of the 
Neo-Confucian’s theory of motivation. Three fundamental positions of the theory of 
the Human Mind and the Moral Mind have the same logical construct as the theory 
of motivation derived from the classics of pre-Qin Confucians.
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and flavors as the product of the Human Mind and the orientation toward 
humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom as the Moral Mind” (Yulgok 
chŏnsŏ, 453). He also stated the same idea in different ways: “The Moral Mind 
promotes allegiance to the king and filial piety to parents, whereas the Human 
Mind arouses desires for food to eat when hungry and wish for clothes to put 
on when cold” (757). 
Of these two kinds of mind, “the Moral Mind represents the principle of 
Heaven, so it has only natural goodness and does not have evil. By contrast, 
the Human Mind has the principle of Heaven as well as human greed, so it 
has both good and evil” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282). The Moral Mind is pure and 
good, because from which the Four Beginnings, the core evidence of human 
natural goodness, come forth (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 816, 849; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 
199, 283). Therefore, the moral motives originating from the Moral Mind, 
which is pure good human nature, is supposed to be the core of all human 
motives rather than biological and selfish desires derived from the Human 
Mind, which is a mixture of good and evil. This is the position of the Neo-
Confucians of the Chosŏn dynasty, and is consistent with that of the pre-Qin 
Confucians. 
According to the Neo-Confucian proposition, the Moral Mind is pure 
goodness itself by nature. T’oegye stated this point as follows: “The Moral 
Mind refers to the innate original human nature itself, and it is working as 
the basis of every human actions from beginning to the end and from birth 
till death; whereas the Four Beginnings refer to the clues from which is 
manifested the existence of the Moral Mind” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). This 
statement points out clearly that the existence of the Moral Mind is known 
through other-directed and moral manifestations of the Four Beginnings. As 
suggested in the above section on emotions, The Four Beginnings are sources 
of other-directed and norm-based emotions; that is, the nature of the Four 
Beginnings reveals in their other-directedness. Therefore, the Moral Mind, 
from which The Four Beginnings come forth, gives rise to the moral emotions 
and motives which are directed toward others or norms in interpersonal 
relations. Yulgok expressed the position indirectly as follows: “The Moral 
Mind arouses such action-readiness as will to pledge allegiance to the king 
and will to devote filial piety to parents, which are basically moral in nature” 
(Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 757). 
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According to the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, moral 
motives are the most essential of all human motives, and the Moral Mind, 
as its root, should be encouraged and developed always in the process of 
everyday life. This proposition is derived from Confucians’ efforts to identify 
humans as social beings. Moral motives lead people to other-directed 
actions, such as having compassion toward and concern about others as 
well as promoting their well-being. Therefore, when people maintain this 
motivational state in daily life, they perceive themselves as connected with 
and strive for promoting harmony with others. In this context, “encouraging 
moral motives and enhancing its root, the Moral Mind” is one of the basic 
features of the Confucian theory of motivation. And this feature enables East 
Asian collectivists to make every effort to promote “connectedness” with 
others and to maintain “harmony” in daily life. This position of encouraging 
other-directed moral motives in everyday human life, which is a basic feature 
of the Confucian theory of motivation, validates the reasoning that East Asian 
collectivism is based on the Confucian system
(2) Control of the Selfish Desires and Emphasis on Self-restraint
According to the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, the 
Human Mind is the basis of selfish desires originating from human biological 
features. T’oegye addressed this point as follows: “The Human Mind elicits 
selfish desires” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 897); “The Human Mind is the basis of 
selfish desires, and selfish desires are overflows of the Human Mind” (897); 
and  “Since the Human Mind is the antithesis of the Moral Mind, it belongs to 
the selfish aspect of the body” (849). In these statements, T’oegye clarified the 
proposition that the Human Mind is the basis of biological and selfish desires. 
In this context, Neo-Confucians asserts that if people pursue the Human 
Mind which is the basis of biological and selfish desires, they tend to get in 
trouble; thus, it is encouraged for them to inhibit the Human Mind and to 
maintain the Moral Mind, from which emanating moral motives. Yulgok 
expressed this proposition as follows: “The temptation of the selfish desires 
leads human beings to become evil. If people indulge in seduction of selfish 
desires and are not aware of it, then they will not come back even after 
losing eventually all of the principles of Heaven (moral motives and basis 
of morality)” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 467); or “People are deprived of any will to do 
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good … if they lose their innate genuine mind” (469). 
For this reason, the Human mind needs to be controlled and the Moral 
Mind should be protected. T’oegye asserted:“Even though there are many 
ways to learn how to control the mind, only two things are most important: 
one is to inhibit selfish desires, and the other is to maintain the principle 
of Heaven. Inhibiting selfish desires belongs to learning in the aspect of 
the Human Mind, whereas maintaining the principle of Heaven belongs 
to learning with respect to the Moral Mind” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). This 
is the fundamental point of the famous theory of inhibiting selfish desires 
and residing in the principle of Heaven (208). Yulgok also expressed the 
same opinion as follows: “People need to observe themselves solemnly, and 
whenever a thought occurs to them, they need to pay attention to where this 
thought comes from. If they perceive physical and selfish desires activate this 
thought, they need to win over and control it, so it will not grow. However, 
if they perceive the Moral Mind (humanity, righteousness, propriety, and 
wisdom) activate this thought, they need to preserve and maintain it, so it will 
not leave” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 453). Yulgok also expressed this position elsewhere, 
saying: “Humans should not let the Human Mind grow wildly. They need to 
lay high emphasis on inhibiting and controlling selfish desires. They need to 
think highly of preserving the Moral Mind and to let it grow and expand” 
(758). 
As the Human Mind is the basis of selfish desires derived from human 
biological features, when external seductions satisfying these desires tempts, 
people are not able to come back and control evil even after they lose all their 
Moral Mind (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 467), or  are deprived of any will to do good for 
themselves and for others (469). This Neo-Confucian argument is consistent 
with that of the pre-Qin Confucians.
In this way, Confucians stress strongly to control and inhibit one’s biological 
and selfish desires. This position is consistent with the characteristics observed 
in East Asian collectivistic society, where self-constraint, especially in the 
situation of self-expression, is highly appreciated, as depicted in Table 1. 
According to the Neo-Confucians propositions, to inhibit and control selfish 
desires is a way to become an ideal person, which is the goal of human life; 
whether or not one can achieve this goal solely depends on oneself; that is, it 
is his/her responsibility because, as moral subjects, people are equipped with 
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the Moral Mind to do good things for oneself and for others; thus, one should 
make every effort to inhibit and control one’s selfish desires. In this context, 
the inference that Confucian position stressing “inhibition and control of 
selfish desires” has brought about collectivistic characteristics in East Asian 
society have logical validity.
(3) Sublimation of Motivations and Emphasis on Self-improvement
Neo-Confucians asserted that in order to get freedom from the constraints of 
the Human Mind, the source of biological and selfish desires, human beings 
should not only suppress (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208, 849) or inhibit their selfish 
desires (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 453, 758), but also control them through encouraging 
the Moral Mind; and thus let moral motives overwhelm selfish desires and 
superintend all their lives. T’oegye addressed this point as follows: “Since the 
Human Mind is the antithesis of the Moral Mind, it belongs to the selfish 
aspect of the body; So because the Human Mind is already inclined toward 
selfishness, it needs to listen to the commands from the Moral Mind and 
to become one with it” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). Yulgok expressed the same 
opinion more strongly, stating that: “A person who are going to control his/
her mind should expand and fulfill the Moral Mind whenever he/she learns 
to know that a certain idea striking him/her at that moment is coming from 
the Moral Mind; However, if he/she perceives that this idea is flowing from 
the Human Mind, he/she should inspect it thoroughly and control it through 
the Moral Mind, and so let the Human Mind follow the command of the 
Moral Mind. Then the Human Mind will become one with the Moral Mind 
eventually” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282-283). Furthermore, Yulgok argued that if the 
Moral Mind controls the Human Mind and they become one, “li (principle) 
and righteousness (a representative of moral motives) will be always 
preserved and accordingly human greed (biological and selfish desires) will 
fade away. Therefore, taking this attitude toward everything, whatever it is 
including other persons, there is nothing that will not fit the Golden Mean (the 
Way)” (453).
The Confucian proposition, that Moral Mind should control the Human 
Mind, and then, the Human Mind is able to become one with the Moral 
Mind, means the fact that the Human Mind and the Moral Mind are not 
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two separate ones. T’oegye addressed this point as: “While the Human Mind 
causes strivings for external objects to satisfy one’s biological and selfish 
desires, the Moral Mind causes pursuing for internal righteousness and 
principle; However this does not mean that there are two different minds, 
because these two are different only in their orientations, whether toward 
outside or toward inside of the self ” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208). As the Human 
Mind and the Moral Mind differ in the level of goodness, whether a mixture 
of good and evil or pure goodness itself (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282), advancing from 
the state of the partially good Human Mind to the state of the wholly good 
Moral Mind (sublimation of motives) can be achieved. 
Neo-Confucians suggested “residing in reverential carefulness” (Kŏgyŏng) 
as a way to control the selfish desires, to maintain the principle of Heaven, 
and eventually to achieve the sublimation of motives. Zhu Xi, the originator 
of Neo-Confucianism in later Song period, also suggested “inspecting the 
mind thoroughly and maintaining it consistently” as the core of Gyŏng, 
which can match with the state of Kŏgyŏng (Yun, S. 1997: 267-271). In Neo-
Confucian thought, Kŏgyŏng is a concrete strategy to control the Human 
Mind and preserve the Moral Mind. 
T’oegye and Yulgok agreed: “Gyŏng is that which superintends the mind 
and so is the basis of all things” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203, 208; T’oegye chŏnsŏ 
2, 796); therefore “Gyŏng is the beginning and the end of ‘the Study to be 
a Superior Man’ (it refers to the whole system of Confucianism)” (T’oegye 
chŏnsŏ 1, 210, 203; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 431). As this Kŏgyŏng becomes the basis 
of Kungni (exploration of principles in depth), which is another method in 
learning how to be a Superior Man (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 185-186; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 
431, 433-434), it can be advocated that learning how to be a Superior Man 
begins with Kŏgyŏng and ends with it (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 
431).
T’oegye and Yulgok traced the core of Confucian theory of self-cultivation 
to the function of Kŏgyŏng. The state of Gyŏng (residing in reverential 
carefulness) has both the cognitive and the motivational functions in 
the whole process of personal self-control. The cognitive function is to 
concentrate one’s attention without distraction (Kim, S. 1989: 160-181); and 
the motivational function is to select the goal which matches well with the 
Way and to activate the appropriate behavior to achieve this goal in daily life 
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(Hahn, D. 1994, 91-96). If the function of Kŏgyŏng is regarded as the core in 
the course of psychological self-control, it is easily understood that Gyŏng 
controls biological and selfish desires (the Human Mind) and activates moral 
motives (the Moral Mind). Yulgok advocated this position as follows: “At the 
state of Gyŏng, selfish desires do not grow up from within; and seduction 
of objects in the outer world cannot go into the mind at all; … Gyŏng is a 
weapon with which to fight against the temptation from one’s outside. When 
a person resides in reverential carefulness (Kŏgyŏng), he/she understands the 
principle of Heaven well, and his/her selfish desires cannot come into his/her 
inner mind” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 476). 
Because biological and selfish desires, which lead people to evil, can be 
controlled by Gyŏng, “following goodness and discarding evil depends on 
maintaining the state of Gyŏng and understanding principles of the Heaven 
correctly” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 684). Yulgok expressed this point as: “Through 
this function to control selfish desires, Gyŏng wins over all the evils” (Yulgok 
chŏnsŏ, 476). So, Kŏgyŏng becomes the direct way toward the sublimation of 
motivation. 
As stated explicitly in the above quotations, it is the fundamental 
proposition of Neo-Confucians in Chosŏn dynasty that human beings should 
and can control the basis of biological and selfish desires (the Human Mind) 
and expand the source of moral motives (the Moral Mind); then, their Human 
Mind would be one with the Moral Mind and  the command of the Moral 
Mind prevail all their lives (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 192, 282-
283); and thus, they can achieve the sublimation of motivation. According to 
them, this sublimation of motivation is the whole ground of self-cultivation 
and self-improvement. The position that “sublimation of motivation through 
the transformation of Human Mind into Moral Mind by means of Kŏgyŏng” 
is derived from a perspective on humans as “beings with infinite possibility” 
to achieve ideal state of person by themselves through constant process of 
“self-improvement.” This advocacy verifies that Confucianism is the origin of 
East Asian collectivism, which stressing on the flexible change in accordance 
with varying contexts and on the incessant self-improvement, as depicted in 
Table 1.
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IV.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF EAST ASIAN 
COLLECTIVISM: CONFUCIAN THOUGHT 
The author examined the idea that collectivistic cultures in East Asian 
Confucian countries such as Korea, China, and Japan are derived from the 
theoretical background of Confucianism. Confucianism was respected as the 
supreme ideology of governing these countries for about 4 to 5 hundred years 
(in case of Japan), a thousand years (Korea) and two thousand years (China) 
until the modern era. Although the Confucianism of Japan was different from 
those of Korea or China, in that China and Korea had selected public officials 
through the state examinations in Confucian Classics, contrary to Japan, all 
of their governments encouraged Confucianism. In East Asian Confucian 
countries, Confucianism is not an already dead tradition of past; Even 
nowadays, Confucianism continues to be central to East Asians’ thoughts, 
behaviors, and value systems.  That is, “the Confucian habits of the heart” (Tu, 
W. 1996: 343) still control their lives today. 
The theoretical basis of Confucianism is the position that humans are 
moral and social beings with flexible plasticity (theory of human nature). On 
this ground, Confucians established an ideal type of a person as the goal in 
human living (theory of Superior Man) and suggested the way how to achieve 
such a goal (theory of self-cultivation) and mode of the lifestyle of this ideal 
person in interpersonal relations (theory of moral practice). The essence of 
Confucianism is laid in the innate characteristics of human nature and the 
concept of the Superior Man. In a word, Confucianism is a theoretical system 
to pursue the “expansion of human existence” toward the Superior Man as an 
ideal model, which is set on the basis of the innate existential characteristics 
of human beings.
The theoretical reason why Confucians pursue the expansion of human 
existence is based on their framework for understanding human beings. The 
fundamental understanding of human beings in Confucian classics can be 
summarized as follows: They consider humans as social beings, autonomous 
moral subjects, and changeable beings with infinite possibilities. That is, 
Confucians perceive humans are such beings who should accept social and 
moral responsibilitie, practice them in their relationships with others, and try 
to achieve the expansion of their existence through their autonomous moral 
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cultivation. 
Confucians seek the fundamental features of human existence in one’s 
interpersonal relationships; that is, their basic position to understand 
human beings is to search for fundamental features of human existence in 
their sociality. They assume that human morality is originated from human 
sociality; that is, people have moral concern about others, because they are 
social beings to live and have harmonious relationship with others. 
Human being’s variability and possibility, emphasized by Confucianism, 
are also grounded on human sociality and morality. That is, human beings 
are equipped with innate basis of morality. The Confucian attitude of 
autonomous and active life involves maintaining and nurturing this basis 
of morality and practicing them in daily life situations; and through which 
people improve themselves and achieve the goal to be a Superior Man. This 
position comes forth from a perspective on humans as social beings. In 
this context, it can be inferred that East Asians with Confucian traditions 
developed collectivistic characteristics on the ground of Confucians’ great 
emphasis on human sociality. 
As depicted in table 1 and found in the review of the comparative studies 
on the differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, in 
individualistic cultures people emphasize autonomy and independence, 
self-assertion, and stability in the aspects of impetus and goal for social 
actions (focus of attention), mode of expressing the self (object to control), 
and stability/variability of personhood (strategy for self-development), 
respectively. To the contrary, in collectivistic cultures people highlight 
connectedness and harmony, self-inhibition, and variability. These three 
aspects are associated with three positions to understand human beings in 
Confucianism. 
The position of viewing humans as social beings holds social responsibility 
and obligation to be the impetus for social actions and seeks the goal of 
all social actions in pursuit of order and harmony in social relationships. 
This is consistent with the position of collectivistic cultures focusing on 
connectedness and harmony in the aspect of impetus for social actions. 
The Superior Man is interested in others and society and places priority on 
caring for others and society along with self-cultivation. Therefore, their 
attention focuses on others or society rather than the self, and consequently, 
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the criteria for interpersonal assessment are concentrated on having concern 
about and caring for others and society. This tendency creates the position of 
respecting and encouraging other-directed emotions whose basic references 
are on others and norms such as the Four Beginnings and shame. The 
tendency to care for society leads actions to respect and encourages moral 
motives toward others and society. Also, the satisfaction of these emotions 
and motives mostly rely on the level of moral self-cultivation. This position 
of viewing humans as social beings in Confucianism demonstrates features 
of collectivistic cultures (impetus for social actions = role, responsibility, 
and obligation in the networks of social relations; goal for social actions = 
connectedness and harmony; focus of attention = others and society) in the 
aspect of the focus of attention and the impetus and goals for actions. In this 
respect, it is evident that the Confucian system of understanding humans as 
social beings functions as the origin of developing collectivism in East Asian 
society. 
The position of viewing human beings as moral subjects emphasizes 
that, since human beings are equipped with moral foundations, they need to 
attribute causes of social actions to the self and explore their inner world. This 
position is consistent with the characteristics found in collectivistic cultures, 
which stress on self-restraint in the aspect of the mode of expressing the self. 
Because people in collectivistic cultures assume that all things depend on the 
self as a moral subject, they attribute all the responsibilities to themselves. The 
responsibility to develop and maintain social order and harmony depends 
on the self; thus, they restrain the self and control their internal attributes 
rather than extraneous contextual conditions and others. The tendency to 
restrain the self and to highlight self-control stands out more prominently 
in the aspect of emotions and motives. They tend to vigorously inhibit and 
regulate ego-centered emotions such as the Seven Passions and biological and 
selfish desires; it is because they assume that strivings for these emotions and 
motives hinder their moral cultivation, since the conditions for induction 
and satisfaction of these ego-centered emotions and motives rely heavily 
on extraneous contexts. The Confucian position on human beings as moral 
subjects is consistent with the features of collectivistic cultures (mode to 
express self = self-restraint; target to control = self) in the aspect of object to 
control and the mode of expressing the self. In this context, it can be inferred 
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clearly that the Confucian system of understanding human beings as moral 
subjects originates collectivistic cultures in East Asian society. 
Finally, the view of humans as changeable beings with infinite possibilities 
emphasizes the flexibility to meet constantly varying responsibilities in 
the networks of social roles. This is consistent with the characteristics of 
the collectivistic cultures, which focuses on variability in accordance with 
the context in the aspect of variability/stability of personhood. People in 
collectivistic cultures strive toward self-improvement, they try to reflect upon 
themselves all the time and to find out and correct their weaknesses and 
faults. The level of self-cultivation and self-improvement would be come out 
as the criteria for interpersonal assessment. In the process of constant self-
improvement, they need to inhibit and control ego-centered emotions such 
as the Seven Passions and biological and selfish desires, and let other-directed 
and norm-based emotions and moral motives preside over all of the self-
centered emotions and selfish desires. Therefore, they need to achieve self-
development through self-improvement. The view of humans as changeable 
beings with infinite possibilities is consistent with the features of collectivistic 
cultures (variability/stability of personhood = variability; strategy for self-
development = self-improvement). Viewing from this point, it is certain that 
the Confucian system to understand humans as changeable beings is also the 
theoretical origin for the development of collectivistic culture in East Asian 
society. 
These three aspect of emphasis found in collectivistic cultures match very 
well with the three positions to understand human beings in Confucianism. 
In addition, it is shown that criteria for interpersonal assessment, mode of 
attribution, theories of emotion and motivation derived from Confucian 
thoughts are fully consistent with those from collectivistic cultures. 
These facts verify that Confucianism has functioned as the origin for the 
development of collectivism in the East Asian region. 
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